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I.  Background 
A. Nursing Practice and Competition Policy 
In 2011 the Institute of Medicine released a major report on the 
nursing profession and its present and potential roles in U.S. health 
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care: The Future of Nursing: Leading Change, Advancing Health.1 
Prominent in the report was concern about undue or excessive 
limitations on nurses’ scope of practice: the first of the report’s four 
“key messages” stated that “[n]urses should practice to the full extent 
of their education and training.”2 The first of the report’s eight 
recommendations was to “remove scope of practice barriers” so that 
they might do so.3 The message and recommendations were based on 
an assessment that “[r]estrictions on scope of practice . . . have 
undermined the nursing profession’s ability to provide and improve 
both general and advanced care.”4 The gist of the Institute of Medi-
cine (IOM)’s claim is that nurses’ regulatory scope of practice, which 
varies state by state,5 often proves to be narrower than the socially 
desirable or medically prudent scope of practice and that the space 
between the regulatory standard and the ideal is large enough that it 
is a substantial health policy problem.  
To ameliorate the problem, the IOM suggests, among other 
things, that regulatory restrictions on the scope of practice receive 
attention from the federal antitrust agencies.6 This paper considers 
what such antitrust therapy might entail, chiefly by explaining some 
of what antitrust law and policy have had to say about licensure and 
scope of practice already. We focus, in particular, on a species of soft 
antitrust intervention employed by one of the nation’s two competi-
tion authorities,7 the Federal Trade Commission (FTC). As noted by 
the IOM, regulatory restrictions on advanced practice registered 
nurses (APRNs) have been a special area of interest for the FTC’s 
competition advocacy program.8 
 
1. INST. OF MED., THE FUTURE OF NURSING: LEADING CHANGE, ADVANCING 
HEALTH 2 (2011) [hereinafter IOM FUTURE OF NURSING REPORT], 
available at 
http://www.thefutureofnursing.org/sites/default/files/Future%20of%20
Nursing%20Report_0.pdf. 
2. Id. at 4. 
3. Id. at 9. 
4. Id. at 4.  
5. Id. at 96-103, 157-61. 
6. Id. at 10-11, 279. 
7. “Antitrust” and “competition” often are used interchangeably with 
regard to antitrust law and policy – “antitrust” perhaps the more 
frequent default in the U.S. and “competition” elsewhere. We intend no 
special usage but hope the term “competition advocacy” will highlight 
that such work aims to further the competition policy goals underlying 
the antitrust laws, unbound by the procedural and substantive limits of, 
e.g., the Sherman and Clayton Acts. 
8. IOM FUTURE OF NURSING REPORT, supra note 1, at 5, 105. In most 
areas of the economy, including many healthcare industries, the FTC 
and the Department of Justice share antitrust authority and have long-
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Most state practice laws recognize APRNs as a distinct category 
of nursing professionals.9 APRNs are nurses with graduate degrees 
trained to provide a broad range of services, including diagnosis and 
treatment of acute and chronic illnesses.10 They are licensed by the 
states in which they practice, attend accredited programs, and are 
certified by nationally accredited certifying boards.11 There are four 
types of APRNs: nurse practitioners (NPs), nurse midwives (NMWs), 
nurse anesthetists (NAs or CRNAs), and clinical nurse specialists 
(CNSs).12  
The competitive impact of licensure and scope of practice re-
strictions has been a matter of ongoing concern to the FTC and its 
staff. In recent years, FTC staff have issued a series of competition 
policy analyses addressing the IOM’s concern about over-strict limits 
on nurses’ scope of practice.13 The staffs of the FTC’s Office of Policy 
 
standing arrangements to avoid inconsistent or duplicative efforts. The 
IOM correctly identifies the potential for both agencies to address 
anticompetitive restrictions on nursing practice and accurately cites to a 
record that, for historical reasons, chiefly comprises FTC advocacy. 
9. Professional titles and nomenclature (e.g., “APRN,” “ARNP,” “nurse 
practitioner,” etc.) as well as APRN licensure criteria and scope of 
practice rules have been converging nationally, although they still vary 
across the states. The National Council of State Boards of Nursing posts 
updated maps of states that recognize “APRN” as a professional title, 
states that permit independent APRN practice, and states that permit 
independent APRN prescribing. APRN Maps, NAT’L COUNCIL OF STATE 
BDS. OF NURSING, https://www.ncsbn.org/2567.htm (last updated Feb. 
2014). See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 37:913(3)(a)(b) (2012); LA. 
ADMIN. CODE tit. XLVII, § 4505 (2012) (exemplifying state regulation of 
APRNs). 
10. IOM FUTURE OF NURSING REPORT, supra note 1, at 23, 26. 
11. See generally APRN CONSENSUS WORK GROUP & NAT’L COUNCIL STATE 
BDS. OF NURSING, CONSENSUS MODEL FOR APRN REGULATION: 
LICENSURE, ACCREDITATION, CERTIFICATION, AND EDUCATION (2008), 
available at 
https://www.ncsbn.org/july_2008_consensus_model_for_aprn_regulat
ion.pdf. We adopt the consensus nomenclature throughout this paper, 
although we note some remaining variation in state regulations. 
12. IOM FUTURE OF NURSING REPORT, supra note 1, at 23, 41-42. 
13. See, e.g., Letter from Susan S. DeSanti et al., Dir., Office of Pol’y 
Planning, FTC, to Thomas P. Willmott & Patrick C. Williams, Reps., 
La. House of Reps. (Apr. 20, 2012) [hereinafter Louisiana FTC Letter], 
available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2012/04/120425louisianastaffcomment.pdf 
(commenting before the Louisiana House of Representatives on the 
likely competitive impact of House Bill 951 concerning APRNs). This is 
discussed in detail, along with the larger body of competition advocacies 
regarding APRNs generally, specialist APRNs such as CRNAs, and 
“limited service” or “retail” clinics, which frequently are staffed by 
APRNs, in Part II.B of this article. 
Health Matrix·Volume 24·2014  
Antitrust and the Future of Nursing 
146 
Planning, Bureau of Economics, and Bureau of Competition14 have 
observed that: (1) many geographic areas (or markets) are subject to 
primary care workforce shortages; (2) market forces may be slow to 
clear those shortages due to regulatory impediments to competition, 
among others; (3) such shortages may impinge upon both price and 
non-price competition between health care service providers; (4) in 
some places, such shortages may impede patient access to primary 
care services and may, in the limit, drive the supply of certain services 
to nil; and (5) scope of practice restrictions on APRNs appear under-
rationalized (at best), where they purport to rest upon patient 
protection concerns that are not based on demonstrated patient 
harms or empirically grounded assessments of substantial patient 
risks.15 Because restrictions on APRNs’ licensure and scope of practice 
may come at a substantial competitive cost, FTC staff have recom-
mended that such limits not be more stringent than patient 
protection requires.16 In broad strokes, they have asked that state 
policymakers account for competitive costs when considering scope of 
practice restrictions, and they have suggested that certain costs 
 
14. Competition advocacies often are issued jointly by the staffs of the 
FTC’s Office of Policy Planning, Bureau of Economics, and Bureau of 
Competition. Formally, advocacies may be issued by either the 
Commission or its staff, although the distinction may sometimes be 
unclear. Individual Commissioners may review comments differently, 
depending on the intended signatories, and the Commission may 
disclaim that staff comments represent the Commission’s own views. 
Still, both Commission and staff advocacy entail the Commission’s 
review of (and editorial input into) analyses researched and drafted by 
the staff, and neither type of comment is issued without a vote to 
authorize issuance by the Commission. Advocacy letters commonly note: 
“This staff letter expresses the views of the Federal Trade Commission’s 
Office of Policy Planning, Bureau of Competition, and Bureau of 
Economics. The letter does not necessarily represent the views of the 
Federal Trade Commission or of any individual Commissioner. The 
Commission, however, has voted to authorize staff to submit these 
comments.” Id. at 6 n.1. 
15. See generally infra Part II.B. As discussed below, state policy makers 
might seek to balance, e.g., patient safety concerns with competition 
concerns, or they might seek to account for service quality (including 
safety) within a competition analysis. In either case, competitive impact 
should be considered, and countervailing consumer protection or patient 
safety concerns ought to be well-founded, rather than speculative or 
pretextual. See, e.g., infra notes 140, 173 - 192 and accompanying text. 
16. For a summary of these FTC staff recommendations as they apply to 
APRNs generally, see DANIEL J. GILMAN & TARA ISA KOSLOV, FED. 
TRADE COMM’N, POLICY PERSPECTIVES: COMPETITION AND THE 
REGULATION OF ADVANCED PRACTICE NURSES (2014), available 
at http://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/policy-
perspectives-competition-regulation-advanced-practice-
nurses/140307aprnpolicypaper.pdf. 
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should not be imposed on the public absent an evidence-based 
promise of countervailing consumer protection benefits.17 
Our discussion will further clarify these analyses, both in their 
particulars and as they comprise a species of policy instrument that is 
often effective but sometimes misunderstood. More broadly, because 
competition issues may be thinly treated in some health policy 
discussions to which they are relevant, our paper will illustrate how a 
competition perspective can frame diverse health policy issues,18 such 
as barriers to health care access, cost and price moderation, innova-
tion in health care delivery models, and health care workforce labor 
supply.19 Moreover, a competition perspective may be especially useful 
for flagging and analyzing cases where regulatory costs are significant-
ly higher for one group of competitors than another or even, in some 
circumstances, as they are imposed on one group of competitors by 
another.20  
Although we pay special attention to licensure and scope-of-
practice restrictions for APRNs, this is not a brief on behalf of any 
particular group of professionals.21 Rather, we seek to better align 
 
17. The term “countervailing consumer protection benefits” is not meant to 
distinguish between competition benefits, which should accrue to 
consumers, and consumer protection benefits, much less to draw an 
agency-specific distinction between, say, the FTC’s competition 
(antitrust) mission and its particular consumer protection mission. 
Rather, we ask whether there are good grounds to anticipate particular 
offsetting benefits, such as consumer harms avoided or risks diminished. 
The benefits thereby offset are themselves consumer protection benefits, 
as they protect consumer access to the benefits of price and non-price 
(qualitative) competition. If the IOM and FTC staff are correct, scope 
of practice restrictions distill the sense in which competition is a 
consumer protection concern, in that artificial or excessive restrictions 
on health care can deprive some consumers of access to basic health 
care. 
18. See William M. Sage et al., Why Competition Law Matters to Health 
Care Quality, 22 HEALTH AFFS. 31, 31 (2003) (“[C]ompetition law has 
long been the forgotten stepchild of health care quality.”). 
19. See generally FTC & U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, IMPROVING HEALTH CARE: 
A DOSE OF COMPETITION 1-2 (2004) [hereinafter A DOSE OF 
COMPETITION], available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/reports/healthcare/040723healthcarerpt.pdf (tying 
such health care competition concerns to health policy issues). 
20. See generally Steven C. Salop et al., A Bidding Analysis of Special 
Interest Regulation: Raising Rivals’ Costs in a Rent Seeking Society, in 
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF REGULATION: PRIVATE INTERESTS IN THE 
REGULATORY PROCESS 102 (1984); Steven C. Salop & David T. 
Scheffman, Raising Rivals’ Costs, 73 AM. ECON. REV. 267 (1983).  
21. Neither are the scope of practice competition comments opposed to any 
particular professional practice. Antitrust does not, in itself, constrain 
the practice of medicine. Of course, any action by an antitrust enforcer 
may be more or less advantageous for one party, or class of competitors, 
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certain areas of health policy planning with competition policy.22 To 
that end, we also outline various empirical questions that might be 
important to further antitrust applications, including research, 
competition advocacy, and, potentially, law enforcement. Such 
questions address both the effects of past agency action and the 
economic costs and benefits of the types of practice restrictions such 
action has targeted.  
Three background sections follow: Section B sketches the FTC’s 
jurisdiction, interest, and experience in health care competition 
generally, and as applied to licensure and scope of practice in particu-
lar; Section C outlines the pertinent antitrust sense of competition 
between and amongst physicians and APRNs; and Section D focuses 
on certain limits to the reach of antitrust: the “state action doctrine” 
and the “Noerr-Pennington doctrine.” This background is important, 
given the bridgework that this paper seeks to construct, but readers 
well-versed in competition law and economics may choose to skim or 
skip it. The paper’s main discussion, in Part II, addresses both general 
competition concerns about licensure and scope of practice regulations 
and the Commission and its staff’s analyses of such concerns.  
B. A Very Brief Background on FTC Jurisdiction, Interest, and 
Experience  
Concerns about professional licensure and scope of practice are at 
the nexus of competition and consumer protection policy. This is a 
special area of interest for the FTC as the FTC Act gives the Com-
mission broad authority with regard to both competition and 
consumer protection matters in most sectors of the economy.23 The 
 
than another. That should not obscure the underlying principle that the 
purpose of the antitrust laws is “the protection of competition, not 
competitors.” Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 320 
(1962). The scope of practice restrictions are not per se anticompetitive, 
and any licensure schemes- for health care professions or any others- 
may raise competitive concerns. Analogous concerns have been raised 
about the “unauthorized practice of law.” See, e.g., Letter from Scott D. 
Hammond, Acting Assistant Att’y Gen., Dep’t of Justice, to Haw. 
Judiciary Pub. Affs. Office (Apr. 20, 2009), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2009/04/V080004hiunauthorizedpracticeoflaw. 
pdf.  
22. In doing so, this paper does not claim that competition issues exhaust, 
or are the most important, policy considerations for licensure and scope 
of practice determinations for nurses or any other health care 
professionals.  
23. The FTC’s authority is defined broadly to deal with “methods . . . acts 
or practices in or affecting commerce.” 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (2012). But 
for particular market sectors expressly excluded from the FTC’s 
enforcement authority, the FTC’s authority ranges broadly over 
“commerce,” without restriction to particular segments of the economy. 
Id. at § 45(a)(2).  
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Act prohibits “[u]nfair methods of competition” and “unfair or 
deceptive acts or practices,”24 and the FTC has a statutory mandate 
“to prevent persons, partnerships, or corporations” from engaging in 
such prohibited methods, acts, and practices.25  
The FTC’s interest in health care competition dates back to the 
Commission’s inception, or nearly so, and the Supreme Court has 
recognized the importance of competition and the application of 
antitrust principles to health care since its 1943 decision in American 
Medical Association v. United States.26 The FTC’s contemporary 
health care competition program may be traced to a 1970s case 
concerning restrictions on advertising and pricing.27 Since then, the 
FTC and its staff have investigated restrictions on the business 
practices of health care providers,28 scrutinized proposed mergers,29 
and brought enforcement actions against health care providers that 
have violated federal competition law.30 For example, the FTC has 
targeted attempts by provider-controlled licensing boards to limit 
competition to the detriment of health care consumers.31 Not inci-
dentally, anticompetitive misuse of credentialing and privileging has 
been the target of law enforcement32 as well as private litigation.33  
 
24. Id. at § 45(a)(1). In 1994, Congress defined an “unfair” act or practice 
over which the FTC has authority as one that “causes or is likely to 
cause substantial injury to consumers which is not reasonably avoidable 
by consumers themselves and not outweighed by countervailing benefits 
to consumers or to competition.” Id. at § 45(n). 
25. Id. at § 45(a)(2). 
26. 317 U.S. 519, 528-29 (1943). 
27. Patrick Thompson, Interview with William E. Kovacic, Chairman, 
Federal Trade Commission, ANTITRUST SOURCE 2-3 (Aug. 2008), 
www.ftc.gov/speeches/kovacic/2008kovacicintrvwc.pdf. 
28. See MARKUS H. MEIER ET AL., FTC, OVERVIEW OF FTC ANTITRUST 
ACTIONS IN HEALTH CARE SERVICES AND PRODUCTS 1 (2013), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/bc/healthcare/antitrust/hcuupdate.pdf. 
29. See, e.g., Evanston Nw. Healthcare Corp., Docket No. 9315 (FTC Aug. 
6, 2007) (Opinion), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/adjpro/d9315/070806opinion.pdf. 
30. See, e.g., Colegio de Optometras, et al., Docket No. C-4199 (FTC Sept. 
11, 2007) (Decision and Order), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0510044/070730decision.pdf (addressing 
price fixing and a concerted refusal to deal with vision and health plans 
by optometrists). 
31. See, e.g., S.C. State Bd. of Dentistry v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 455 F.3d 
436, 439 (4th Cir. 2006). 
32. See Med. Staff of Mem. Med Ctr., 110 F.T.C. 541 at *1-2 (1998) 
(consent order) (addressing allegations of anticompetitive combination 
or conspiracy to deny credentials to nurse midwife). 
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Congress also has assigned to the FTC a research, education, and 
policy mission. Section 6 of the FTC Act gives the Commission the 
authority to conduct investigations in the service of FTC enforcement 
actions.34 Section 6 also provides a more general authority to investi-
gate and report on market developments in the public interest and 
gives the Commission the authority to make legislative recommenda-
tions based on those investigations.35 Economic and policy research36 
and competition advocacy37 thus are at the core of the FTC’s statuto-
ry mission, alongside the Commission’s civil law enforcement 
responsibilities.38  
 
33. See, e.g., Boczar v. Manatee Hosps. & Health Sys., Inc., 993 F.2d 1514, 
1516 (11th Cir. 1993) (reversing judgment notwithstanding the verdict 
because, on de novo review, “there was evidence from which a jury 
could reasonably infer that the hospital conspired with members of its 
medical staff and peer review committees . . . to restrain trade in 
violation of the Sherman Act.”). Cf. Nurse Midwifery Assocs. v. 
Hibbett, 918 F.2d 605, 617 (6th Cir. 1990) (reversing summary 
judgment for certain defendant physicians and physician insurance 
company on Sherman Act conspiracy claim). 
34. 15 U.S.C. § 46 (2012). 
35. Id. at §§ 46(b), (f). 
36. See PAULINE M. IPPOLITO & JANIS K. PAPPALARDO, FTC, ADVERTISING 
NUTRITION & HEALTH: EVIDENCE FROM FOOD ADVERTISING 1977 – 1997, 
at E-1 (2002), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/be/healthcare/wp/20_Ippolito_AdvertisingNutritio
n&Health.pdf; A DOSE OF COMPETITION, supra note 19, at 1 (noting a 
report jointly issued by the antitrust agencies analyzing diverse 
competition issues in health care services and goods industries). 
37. FTC and staff advocacy may comprise letters or comments addressing 
specific policy issues, Commission or staff testimony before legislative or 
regulatory bodies, or amicus briefs. See, e.g., Letter from Susan S. 
DeSanti, Dir., Office of Pol’y Planning, FTC, et al., to Sam Jones, Rep., 
La. House of Reps. (May 22, 2009), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/advocacy_documents
/ftc-staff-comment-louisiana-house-Rep.s-concerning-louisiana-house-bill-
687-practice/v090009louisianahb687amendment.pdf (regarding proposed 
restrictions on mobile dentistry); FTC & DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ILLINOIS 
CERTIFICATE OF NEED LAWS: HEARING BEFORE THE ILLINOIS TASK 
FORCE ON HEALTH PLANNING REFORM (2008) [FTC & DOJ ILLINOIS 
STATEMENT], available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2008/09/V080018illconlaws.pdf; Brief for FTC 
as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellants, Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride 
Antitrust Litig. v. Bayer AG and Bayer Corp., 466 F.3d 187 (2d Cir. 
2005). 
38. Calling for the creation of a federal trade commission before a joint 
session of Congress in 1914, Woodrow Wilson envisioned an 
“indispensable instrument of information and publicity, a clearing house 
for the facts by which both the public mind and the managers of great 
business undertakings should be guided, and as an instrumentality for 
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This research, advocacy, and education mission complements the 
FTC’s law enforcement mission but may have a broader purview than 
law enforcement itself.39 Any number of legal or pragmatic issues can 
militate against litigation in circumstances raising competitive 
concerns, and the reach of antitrust law enforcement is narrower than 
the pro-competition policy goals that such enforcement aims to 
protect.40 Advocacy may, in particular, address regulatory impedi-
ments to effective competition, which sometimes prove especially 
effective and durable but may or may not be actionable under the 
federal antitrust laws.41 To help provide both information and analytic 
tools to lower such barriers, whether subject to the antitrust laws or 
not, the FTC and its staff have issued reports regarding various 
segments of the health care industry.42 The Commission and its staff 
also have intervened as amici curiae in private controversies.43 Finally, 
in response to requests from federal and state policy makers, the FTC 
and its staff may examine the potential competitive impact of 
particular policy proposals, such as bills or proposed rules, that may 
affect consumers’ spending on, choices of, or even basic access to 
health care services. Such comments have addressed, for example, 
 
doing justice to business where the processes of the courts or the natural 
forces of correction are inadequate.” H.R. Doc. No. 625, at 6 (1914).  
39. See, e.g., Maureen K. Ohlhausen, Identifying, Challenging, and 
Assigning Political Responsibility for State Regulation Restricting 
Competition, 2 COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L 151, 156-57 (2006) (describing 
competition advocacy as “beyond enforcement” of the antitrust laws); 
James C. Cooper et al., Theory and Practice of Competition Advocacy 
at the FTC, 72 GEO. MASON ANTITRUST L.J. 1091, 1102-04 (2005) 
(describing competition policy as a means to address “political market 
failure” and ameliorate consumer harm). See also WILLIAM E. KOVACIC, 
FTC, THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION AT 100: INTO OUR 2ND CENTURY 
THE CONTINUING PURSUIT OF BETTER PRACTICES 92-109, 121-24 (2009) 
(discussing policy research and development and the role of the FTC 
advocacy program). 
40. See, e.g., Cooper et al., supra note 39, at 1110-11 nn. 65-67. 
41. Ohlhausen, supra note 39, at 152. See also infra Part I.D (providing a 
very brief sketch of the Noerr-Pennington and State Action doctrines). 
42. See, e.g., FTC, PHARMACY BENEFIT MANAGERS: OWNERSHIP OF MAIL-
ORDER PHARMACIES (2005), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/reports/pharmbenefit05/050906pharmbenefitrpt.pdf
; A DOSE OF COMPETITION, supra note 19, at 1. Staff reports also have 
addressed, in particular, competitive issues associated with professional 
licensure. See, e.g., CAROLYN COX & SUSAN FOSTER, FTC, THE COSTS 
AND BENEFITS OF OCCUPATIONAL REGULATION iv (1990), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/be/consumerbehavior/docs/reports/CoxFoster90.pd
f. 
43. See, e.g., Brief of FTC as Amicus Curiae, Nurse Midwifery Assocs. v. 
Hibbett, 918 F.2d 605 (6th Cir. 1990). 
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regulatory costs associated with state certificate of need require-
ments,44 pharmacy benefits regulations,45 and proposals to exempt 
certain health care providers from antitrust scrutiny.46  
More directly pertinent to nursing, and discussed at greater 
length below, these competition advocacy comments have addressed 
restrictions that would be imposed on “retail” or “limited service” 
clinics (RCs or LSCs),47 which typically are staffed by APRNs, as well 
 
44. E.g., Hearing on S.B. 2326 Before the Florida State Senate, 2008 Leg., 
Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2008) (statement of FTC), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/advocacy_documents
/ftc-prepared-statement-florida-senate-concerning-florida-certificate-
need-laws/v080009florida.pdf; FTC & DOJ ILLINOIS STATEMENT, supra 
note 37. 
45. E.g., Letter from Susan S. DeSanti, Dir., Office of Pol’y Planning, FTC, 
et al., to James L. Seward, Senator, New York Senate (Aug. 8, 2011), 
available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2011/08/110808healthcarecomment.pdf 
(concerning New York Assembly Bill 5502-B, proposed to regulate use of 
mail order pharmacies by health plans offering prescription drug 
coverage). 
46. E.g., Letter from Susan S. DeSanti, Dir., Office of Pol’y Planning, FTC, 
et al., to John J. Bonacic, Senator, New York Senate 4 (Oct. 20, 2011), 
available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/advocacy_documents
/ftc-staff-comment-honorable-john-j.bonacic-concerning-new-york-
s.b.3186-allow-health-care-providers-negotiate-collectively-health-
plans/111024nyhealthcare.pdf (concerning New York S.B. 3186-A, which 
proposed to allow health care providers to negotiate collectively with 
health plans). 
47. E.g., Letter from Susan S. DeSanti, Dir., Office of Pol’y Planning, FTC, 
et al., to Jill Brown, Ky. Cabinet for Health and Fam. Servs. 1 (Jan. 28, 
2010) [Kentucky FTC Letter to Brown], available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/advocacy_documents
/ftc-staff-comment-kentucky-cabinet-health-and-family-services-
concerning-proposed-rule-regulate/100202kycomment.pdf (concerning a 
proposed rule to regulate RCs or “limited service clinics”); Letter from 
Maureen K. Ohlhausen, Dir., Office of Pol’y Planning, FTC, et al., to 
Elaine Nekritz, Rep., Illinois House of Reps. 1 (May 29, 2008) 
[hereinafter Illinois FTC Letter], available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/advocacy_documents
/ftc-staff-comment-representative-elaine-nekritz-illinois-general-
assembly-concerning-h.b.5372-regulate-retail-health-
facilities/v080013letter.pdf (concerning H.B. 5372 to regulate retail 
health facilities); Letter from Maureen K. Ohlhausen, Dir., Office of 
Pol’y Planning, FTC, et al., to LouAnn Stanton, Mass. Dep’t of Pub. 
Health 1 (Sept. 27, 2007) [hereinafter 2007 Massachusetts FTC Letter], 
available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/advocacy_documents
/ftc-staff-comment-massachusetts-department-public-health-concerning-
proposed-regulation-limited/v070015massclinic.pdf (regarding proposed 
regulation of “limited service clinics” in Massachusetts).  
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as restrictions expressly aimed at APRNs48 or specific types of 
APRNs, such as nurse midwives (NMWs)49 and nurse anesthetists 
(CRNAs).50 For example, in 2012 – at the request of Louisiana state 
 
48. E.g., Letter from Andrew Gavil, Dir., Office of Pol’y Planning, FTC, et 
al., to Kay Khan, Rep., Mass. House of Reps. (Jan. 17, 2014) 
[hereinafter 2014 Massachusetts FTC Letter], available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/advocacy_documents
/ftc-staff-comment-massachusetts-house-representatives-regarding-house-
bill-6-h.2009-concerning-supervisory-requirements-nurse-practitioners-
nurse-anesthetists/140123massachusettnursesletter.pdf; Letter from 
Andrew Gavil, Dir., Office of Pol’y Planning, FTC, et al., to Theresa 
W. Conroy, Rep., Conn. House of Reps. (Mar. 19, 2013) [hereinafter 
Connecticut FTC Letter], available at 
http://ftc.gov/os/2013/03/130319aprnconroy.pdf; Letter from Susan S. 
DeSanti, Dir., Office of Pol’y Planning, FTC, et al., to Paul Hornback, 
Senator, Ky. Senate 1, 3 (Mar. 26, 2012) [hereinafter Kentucky FTC 
Letter to Hornback], available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/advocacy_documents
/ftc-staff-letter-honorable-paul-hornback-senator-commonwealth-
kentucky-state-senate-concerning/120326ky_staffletter.pdf (concerning 
Kentucky Senate Bill 187 and the regulation of advanced practice 
registered nurses); Letter from Susan S. DeSanti, Dir., Office of Pol’y 
Planning, FTC, et al., to Rodney Ellis & Royce West, Senators, Tex. 
State Senate 1-3 (May 11, 2011) [hereinafter Texas FTC Letter], 
available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/advocacy_documents
/ftc-staff-letter-honorable-rodney-ellis-and-honorable-royce-west-senate-
state-texas-concerning-texas/v110007texasaprn.pdf (concerning Texas 
Senate Bills 1260 and 1339 and the regulation of Advanced Practice 
Registered Nurses); Letter from Susan S. DeSanti, Dir., Office of Pol’y 
Planning, FTC, et al., to Daphne Campbell, Rep., Fla. House of Reps. 
1-3 (March 22, 2011) [hereinafter Florida FTC Letter], available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/advocacy_documents
/ftc-staff-letter-honorable-daphne-campbell-florida-house-representatives-
concerning-florida-house/v110004campbell-florida.pdf (concerning 
Florida House Bill 4103 and the regulation of ARNPs); Hearing on 
Review of West Virginia Laws Governing the Scope of Practice for 
Advanced Practice Registered Nurses and Consideration of Possible 
Revisions to Remove Practice Restrictions Before Subcomm. A of the 
Joint Comm. on Health, W. Va. Legislature (W. Va. 2008) (statement 
of FTC) [hereinafter West Virginia Testimony], available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/advocacy_documents
/ftc-staff-testimony-subcommittee-wv-legislature-laws-governing-scope-
practice-advanced-practice/120907wvatestimony.pdf; Hearing on 
Proposed Bill 6-317 to Create Specific Licensing Requirements for 
Expanded Role Nurses Before the Council of the District of Columbia 
(Nov. 1985) (statement of FTC) [hereinafter FTC D.C. Comment]. 
49. Brief of FTC as Amicus Curiae, Nurse Midwifery Assocs. v. Hibbett, 
918 F.2d 605 (6th Cir. 1990). 
50. See Letter from Susan S. DeSanti, Dir., Office of Pol’y Planning, FTC, 
et al., to Jeanne Kirkton, Rep., Missouri House of Reps. (Mar. 27, 2012) 
[hereinafter Missouri CRNA Letter], available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2012/03/120327kirktonmissouriletter.pdf; Letter 
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representatives – FTC staff addressed the likely competitive impact of 
a bill that would have removed, for APRNs practicing in medically 
underserved areas, the need to establish a formal, written collabora-
tive practice agreement with a supervising physician before providing 
services otherwise within APRNs’ scope of practice.51 The staff did 
not seek to specify or redraw that scope of practice. Rather, it 
identified the potential costs of such agreements as statutory require-
ments for APRN practice, and the potential impact of those costs on 
the availability and price of primary health care services, and it asked 
the legislature to consider whether there was evidence of countervail-
ing health or safety benefits adequate to offset competitive costs.52 
C. Competitors and Competition  
The antitrust sense of “competitors” is somewhat specialized. 
Thorough explication goes well beyond the scope of this paper, which 
should not founder on the complexities of market definition or, for 
that matter, questions about when or to what extent market defini-
tion may be critical to antitrust analysis.53 We note some core 
concepts nonetheless, not least to offset common contentions that 
APRNs cannot function as substitutes for physicians.54 Antitrust is 
 
from Susan S. DeSanti, Dir., Office of Pol’y Planning, FTC, et al., to 
Gary Odom, Rep., Tenn. House of Reps. (Sept. 28, 2011) [hereinafter 
Tennessee FTC Letter to Odom], available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2011/10/V11001tennesseebill.pdf; Letter from 
Susan S. DeSanti, Dir., Office of Pol’y Planning, FTC, et al., to Patricia 
E. Shaner, Office of Gen. Counsel, Ala. State Bd. of Med. Exam’rs 
(Nov. 3, 2010) [hereinafter Alabama FTC Letter], available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2010/11/101109alabamabrdme.pdf. 
51. Louisiana FTC Letter, supra note 13, at 2. Although certain 
certification standards are established nationally for APRNs, state law 
varies on the particulars of APRN scope of practice and on the question 
of whether APRNs must establish such collaborative practice 
agreements to offer services within that state-specific scope of practice. 
IOM FUTURE OF NURSING REPORT, supra note 1, at 96-103, 157-61. See 
also 2014 Massachusetts FTC Letter, supra note 48 (addressing nurse 
anesthetist regulations as well as nurse practitioner regulations). 
52. Louisiana FTC Letter, supra note 13, at 2, 5. 
53. See, e.g., Jonathan B. Baker, Market Definition: An Analytical 
Overview, 74 ANTITRUST L.J. 129 (2007); U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE AND 
FTC, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES 9-15 (2010) [hereinafter 
HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES], available at 
http://ftc.gov/os/2010/08/100819hmg.pdf. See also Steven C. Salop, 
The First Principles Approach to Antitrust, Kodak, and Antitrust at the 
Millennium, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 187 (2000) (regarding an integrated or 
“first principles” approach). 
54. See, e.g., Jeffrey Cain, Letter to the Editor, Addressing the Doctor 
Shortage, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 30, 2012), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/31/opinion/addressing-the-doctor-
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concerned with the process of competition and, in particular, with the 
competitive effects of mergers or certain types of conduct that 
impinge upon consumer welfare.55 To determine competitive effects, 
the agencies and the courts often begin with market definition,56 that 
is, describing product or service markets and geographic areas in 
which competition takes place. Market participants – potential 
competitors – are those entities earning revenue in the relevant 
market.57  
Fundamental to market definition is the economic measure of de-
mand substitution.58 Demand substitution is consumers’ (buyers’) 
ability and willingness to switch between particular goods or services, 
from a to b, in response to a price increase or a non-price change 
(such as a perceived change in quality or convenience) associated with 
a.59 Competitors are firms (or professionals) offering substitute 
services or goods to an extent that is economically significant. 
Competing services or goods are those that function – or likely would 
 
shortage.html (“[A] nurse practitioner is not a physician and is not a 
substitute for a physician.”). 
55. See, e.g., Salop, supra note 53, at 188 (“[C]ompetitive effect is the true 
core of antitrust.”). Cf. Robert H. Bork, Legislative Intent and the 
Policy of the Sherman Act, 9 J.L. & ECON. 7, 10 (1966) (noting that the 
legislative history of the Sherman Act “contains no colorable support for 
application by courts of any value premise or policy other than the 
maximization of consumer welfare”); Leegin Creative Leather Prods., 
Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 886 (2007) (holding that “[i]n its 
design and function” the rule of reason approach that dominates 
antitrust analysis “distinguishes between restraints with anticompetitive 
effect that are harmful to the consumer and restraints stimulating 
competition that are in the consumer’s best interest”). 
56. See, e.g., HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 53, at 9. The 
analysis may be iterative: determination of competitive effects need not 
merely be the output of an analytic process commencing with market 
definition; economic evidence of competitive effects also may be used to 
test putative market definitions. Id. at 7. In certain contexts it can 
trump them. Salop, supra note 53, at 188-89. 
57. HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 53, at 21. 
58. See id. at 7 (“Market Definition focuses solely on demand substitution 
factors . . . .”); see also United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & 
Co., 351 U.S. 377, 395 (1956); Baker, supra note 53, at 132-38 
(discussing primacy of demand – or buyer side – substitution but also 
noting circumstances considering the supply side). 
59. HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 53, at 7. That may be 
determined by econometric estimates of own-price elasticity (demand 
elasticity). Cross elasticity of demand may also be used to identify 
potential substitutes in a market. See generally, Baker, supra note 53, at 
138-41 (discussing the determinations of econometric estimates of own-
price elasticity (demand elasticity) and cross elasticity of demand, which 
may also be used to identify potential substitutes in a market). 
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function – as substitutes (or alternatives) to an extent that is econom-
ically significant.60 APRNs already provide, and receive compensation 
for, some primary care services also provided by physicians.61 Moreo-
ver, estimates of the range of primary care services that APRNs 
might provide easily suggest that such practitioners are at least 
potential competitors to primary care physicians.62 And one recent 
study suggests that the share of primary care treatment undertaken 
by APRNs depends on the state regulatory environment in which 
they practice.63  
Hence, if they exert or are likely to exert significant competitive 
pressure on each other, primary care physicians and nurse practition-
ers may be competitors even if: they often work in collaboration; they 
do not offer an identical range of services; and many consumers do 
not value their services equally.64 That is, to say such professionals are 
competitors is to say that their services are potential substitutes, but 
to say that services are potential substitutes is not to say that they 
are indistinguishable. We do not suppose that these groups of compet-
itors are perfect substitutes across the full range of services they offer 
 
60. Readers unfamiliar with antitrust law and economics may wish to 
consult the Horizontal Merger Guidelines for a sketch of the 
“hypothetical monopolist” test and the “SSNIP” test (regarding a 
hypothetical monopolist’s ability to impose a small but significant 
increase in price) and their iterative application in market definition. 
HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 53, at 11-16. 
61. See, e.g., IOM FUTURE OF NURSING REPORT, supra note 1, at 26 tbl. 1-1. 
62. See, e.g., OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, OTA-HCS-37, NURSE 
PRACTITIONERS, PHYSICIAN ASSISTANTS, AND CERTIFIED NURSE-
MIDWIVES: A POLICY ANALYSIS 39 (1986) [hereinafter OTA HEALTH 
TECH. CASE STUDY] (“Most observers conclude that most primary care 
traditionally provided by physicians can be delivered by NPs and 
PAs.”). Hence, at least for a substantial range of primary care services, 
APRNs might collect revenues in some of the same geographic and 
service markets as some physicians, if permitted by law and regulation 
to do so.  
63. Yong-Fang Kuo et al., States with the Least Restrictive Regulations 
Experienced the Largest Increase in Patients Seen by Nurse 
Practitioners, 32 HEALTH AFFS. 1236, 1238-40 (2013) (reporting on a 
study based on a five-percent sample of Medicare claims data). For 
various reasons, particular treatments conducted by APRNs may not be 
accurately reflected in the claims data. See David I. Auerbach, Nurse 
Practitioner Billing Practices Could Obscure True Numbers, 
HEALTHAFFAIRS (July 18, 2013), 
http://content.healthaffairs.org/content/32/7/1236/reply. Still, these do 
not impugn the general direction of the reported results, which suggests 
that greater substitution occurs under less restrictive regulatory regimes. 
64. Certainly, there is no normative suggestion that they ought to do so. 
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or even for any particular service.65 We do not suppose that substitu-
tion is equally (or even significantly) effective across the whole 
geographic area in which each competing professional (or firm) does 
business. And we do not suppose that competitors are professionals 
(or firms) who do not, or should not, collaborate or offer complemen-
tary services.66 
Indeed, questions about competitive effects may remain inde-
pendently of questions about whether or to what extent the practice 
of medicine and the practice of nursing comprise competing or 
complementary services. Investing one group of professional service 
providers with regulatory authority over another might raise competi-
tive concerns if the services offered by the two groups are competing 
ones or complements.67 For example, one might be concerned about  
65. Several authors have suggested that expanding APRN scope of practice 
might have, among others, the salutary competitive effect of prompting 
some physicians to focus more efficiently on their relative competitive 
advantages. See, e.g., IOM FUTURE OF NURSING REPORT, supra note 1, 
at 76, 98; FTC D.C. Comment, supra note 48, at 4. That seems 
generally plausible, although we express no opinion on the extent to 
which primary care physicians would shift the mix of services they 
provide or the relative weighting of services within the mix.  
66. Competition law and policy recognize that particular collaborations 
among competitors may yield pro-competitive and pro-consumer 
efficiencies, and contemporary antitrust is not generally hostile to 
vertical integration. FTC & U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST 
GUIDELINES FOR COLLABORATIONS AMONG COMPETITORS (2000), 
available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2000/04/ftcdojguidelines.pdf; U.S. 
DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FTC, STATEMENTS OF ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT 
POLICY IN HEALTH CARE (1996) [hereinafter DOJ & FTC POLICY 
STATEMENTS], available at 
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/0000.pdf. Cf. Antitrust 
Enforcement Policy Regarding Accountable Care Organizations 
Participating in the Medicare Shared Savings Program, 76 Fed. Reg. 
67,026, 67,026-28 (Oct. 28, 2011) (exemplifying statutory and policy 
goals to permit potentially pro-competitive clinical integrations while 
seeking to protect both Medicare beneficiaries and commercially insured 
patients from anticompetitive harm). 
67. That these professionals may offer complementary services should be 
trivial and that they should do so under a particular model is evidenced 
in AMA comments about constraining the role of APRNs as “health 
care delivery is evolving to a physician-led team approach to ensure 
better care coordination and outcomes for patients.” Letter from James 
L. Madara, Am. Med. Ass’n, to the Hon. David G. Perry and the Hon. 
Dan Foster, W. Va. Legislature Joint Comm. on Health Subcomm. A, at 
1 (Sept. 10, 2012) [Madara Letter], available at http://www.ama-
assn.org/resources/doc/arc/ama-letter-ftc-wv.pdf. Competitive concerns 
may be distinct in the case of complementary services. See, e.g., Dennis 
W. Carlton & Michael Waldman, The Strategic Use of Tying to 
Preserve and Create Market Power in Evolving Industries, 33 RAND J. 
ECON. 194, 194 (2002) (regarding complements and tying more 
generally). 
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the costs to competition when the law requires that APRNs enter into 
formal collaborative practice agreements with physicians, even if 
many APRNs would seek and contract for collaborative arrangements 
absent the legal requirement.68 Voluntary collaborative agreements 
could, in theory, encompass widely varying arrangements. Under such 
arrangements even independently practicing APRNs might pay for 
chart review or consultation up to the value of those inputs to the 
APRN’s practice. But where collaborating physicians are in short 
supply – or where supply is effectively restricted by regulation69 – 
there is a risk that the costs of such agreements may tend to rise and 
that the quality of collaborative input may fall.70 In brief, the legal 
requirement for an agreement – imposed on one of the contracting 
parties but not the other – might well encourage physician rent-
seeking, raising the costs of both nursing services and collaboration 
between physicians and APRNs above market levels. Those costs may 
sometimes be prohibitive, deterring entry for some APRNs or making 
some existing practices nonviable. Not incidentally, such regulations 
may constrain the ability of providers to innovate in developing new 
models of health care delivery.71 
D. Exogenous Limits: Noerr-Pennington and the State Action Doctrine  
The Noerr-Pennington72 and State Action Doctrines73 are judicial 
doctrines that limit the application of the federal antitrust laws to  
68. See, e.g., Louisiana FTC Letter, supra note 13, at 3, 5. Many APRNs 
would contract independently for certain collaborative or supervisory 
services or would do so de facto through employment by a health care 
service provider that has internalized various collaborative or 
supervisory practices in its administrative structure and procedures. 
Regarding the potential diversity of collaborations. See, e.g., PAMELA 
MITCHELL ET AL., CORE PRINCIPLES & VALUES OF EFFECTIVE TEAM-
BASED HEALTH CARE 11 (2012), available at 
https://www.nationalahec.org/pdfs/VSRT-Team-Based-Care-Principles-
values.pdf.  
69. See IOM FUTURE OF NURSING REPORT, supra note 1, at 157-61 tbl. 3-A1 
(describing state-by-state limits on the number of nurse practitioners 
with whom a physician may establish a collaborative practice agreement 
(or whom a physician may supervise)). 
70. See, e.g., Louisiana FTC Letter, supra note 13, at 3, 5. That is, either 
effect may be observed at the margin. We do not suggest that such 
effects are necessary or typical. 
71. Id.; see also Julie Fairman, Professor of Nursing & Dir. of the Barbara 
Bates Center for the Study of the History, Factors Influencing Value – 
Enhancing Entrepreneurship in Health Care Delivery, Address at RAND 
Policy Symposium (Oct. 4, 2011) (transcript on file with author). 
72. The doctrine takes its name from the first two in a line of Supreme 
Court cases articulating its principles: E. R.R. Presidents’ Conference v. 
Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961) and United Mine 
Workers of America v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965). 
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certain private conduct and state government decisions respectively. 
Each of these doctrines describes core exemptions or immunities, 
contemplates exceptions, and ranges over problematic or contentious 
areas of application that we cannot engage, much less resolve, in this 
paper.74 We offer the following sketch to help distinguish, in a general 
way, areas in which either competition advocacy or law enforcement 
may be viable from areas in which competition advocacy may apply 
more broadly than federal law enforcement authority. 
In brief, the Noerr-Pennington Doctrine seeks to avoid a conflict 
between competition values and First Amendment speech and 
petitioning rights by restricting the application of the antitrust laws 
to private acts that urge, even to anticompetitive ends, government 
action. The State Action Doctrine, partly on federalism grounds, 
shields some anticompetitive conduct undertaken by the states 
themselves from federal antitrust scrutiny. In particular, it shields 
sovereign state acts of the legislature and certain other conduct 
implementing sovereign state policies.75 For example, certain forms of 
coordinated conduct are discouraged under the antitrust laws with 
some deemed per se unlawful collusion to fix prices or limit output; 
however, under Noerr-Pennington, private parties acting jointly 
through a trade association may seek anticompetitive advantages 
before the legislature, including some that they could not seek to 
implement privately.76 Such immunity does not, however, extend to 
lobbying that is “ostensibly directed toward influencing governmental 
action [that] is a mere sham to cover what is actually nothing more 
 
73. The State Action Doctrine is articulated in Parker v. Brown and its 
progeny. 317 U.S. 341, 342-43 (1943). In Parker, the Court found the 
Sherman Act’s reach limited by a legislative intent to reach “individual 
and not state action.” Id. at 352. 
74. For more complete accounts of both core doctrines as well as discussion 
of difficult, unsettled, or contentious areas of application, see, e.g., FTC, 
ENFORCEMENT PERSPECTIVES ON THE NOERR-PENNINGTON DOCTRINE 
(2006), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/reports/P013518enfperspectNoerr-
Penningtondoctrine.pdf; FTC, OFFICE POL’Y PLANNING, REPORT OF THE 
STATE ACTION TASK FORCE (2003), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/advocacy_documents
/report-state-action-task-force/stateactionreport.pdf.  
75. FTC, REPORT OF THE STATE ACTION TASK FORCE, supra note 74, at 1. 
76. In Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., for example, the Court held that the 
application of the Sherman Act to the railroads’ publicity and lobbying 
campaign at issue was precluded by the right of petition, independent of 
the campaign’s motivation. 365 U.S. at 138. More generally, “the 
Sherman Act does not prohibit two or more persons from associating 
together in an attempt to persuade the legislature or the executive to 
take particular action with respect to a law that would produce a 
restraint or a monopoly.” Id. at 136. 
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than an attempt to interfere directly with the business relationships of 
a competitor.”77  
Under the State Action Doctrine, a state legislature may enact 
laws that directly diminish or even supplant competition, although it 
cannot simply authorize private parties to violate the antitrust laws 
or declare such violations lawful by fiat.78 Certain “legislative” acts of 
a state supreme court also are deemed sovereign state acts.79 Other 
entities may enjoy some measure of immunity,80 derived from the 
deference accorded the sovereign state, although to a lesser degree 
than that accorded the state itself. Municipalities or state-authorized 
hospital boards, for example, may be shielded to the extent that they 
act “in furtherance or implementation of clearly articulated and 
affirmatively expressed state policy.”81 Other state sanctioned entities 
 
77. Id. at 144. Compare Cal. Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unltd, 404 
U.S. 508, 515-16 (1972) (holding that Noerr protection does not extend 
to a combination of entrepreneurs aiming “to harass and deter their 
competitors from having ‘free and unlimited access’ to the agencies and 
courts” and “to defeat that right by massive, concerted, and purposeful 
activities of the group”), with Prof. Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. 
Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 508 U.S. 49, 51 (1993) (“[L]itigation 
cannot be deprived of immunity as a sham unless the litigation is 
objectively baseless.”). 
78. Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 351 (articulating the general principle of 
the exemption and qualifying that “a state does not give immunity to 
those who violate the Sherman Act by authorizing them to violate it, or 
by declaring that their action is lawful”). 
79. Hoover v. Ronwin, 466 U.S. 558, 568 (1984) (explaining “Parker’s basic 
reasoning” exempts the direct acts of a state legislature or a state 
supreme court, acting in its legislative rather than judicial capacity); 
Goldfarb v. Va. State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 790 (1975) (“The threshold 
inquiry in determining if an anticompetitive activity is state action of 
the type the Sherman Act was not meant to proscribe is whether the 
activity is required by the State acting as sovereign.”). 
80. Whether this is deemed an exemption (from antitrust liability) or 
immunity (from antitrust suit) has sometimes been controversial. S.C. 
State Bd. of Dentistry v. F.T.C., 455 F.3d 436, 445 (4th Cir. 2006) 
(“[W]e cannot conclude that the Court’s occasional after-the-fact use of 
the term ‘Parker immunity’ created an immunity from suit.”).  
81. For example, “Cities are not themselves sovereign; they do not receive 
all the federal deference of the States that create them.” Cmty. 
Commc’ns Co. v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40, 50-51 (1982) (quoting 
Lafayette v. La. Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 412-13 (1978) 
(holding that cities are granted extensive “home rule” authority by state 
statute and are not thereby entitled to state action immunity)).City of 
Boulder did not reach the question of whether municipalities had to 
satisfy both prongs of the test imposed on state-authorized private 
parties. See id. at 51. The Court later resolved this issue in Town of 
Hallie v. City of Eau Claire. 471 U.S. 34, 47 (1985) (“Once it is clear 
that state authorization exists, there is no need to require the State to 
supervise actively the municipality’s execution of what is a properly 
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and those private parties whose conduct is “prompted” by state 
action82 are only shielded to the extent that they meet two general 
conditions: “First, the challenged restraint must be ‘one clearly 
articulated and affirmatively expressed as state policy’; second, the 
policy must be ‘actively supervised’ by the State itself.”83 Independent 
state boards, in particular, are not themselves sovereign and may 
sometimes be fully subject to antitrust scrutiny.84 
State statutory law requiring that certain educational criteria be 
met before a person may be licensed as a physician or a nurse may be 
both a substantial barrier to entry and a valid exercise of the state’s 
 
delegated function.”). In FTC v. Phoebe Putney Heath System, Inc., a 
unanimous Court recently held that “Georgia’s grant of general 
corporate powers to hospital authorities does not include permission to 
use those powers anticompetitively . . . [and hence] that the clear-
articulation test is not satisfied and state-action immunity does not 
apply.” 133 S.Ct. 1003, 1007 (2013). 
82. Goldfarb, 421 U.S. at 791 (1975) (holding that “[i]t is not enough that ... 
anticompetitive conduct is ‘prompted’ by state action” and that the 
state bar is not generally immune from antitrust scrutiny even if the 
“State Bar is a state agency for some limited purposes . . .”). See also 
Patrick v. Burget, 486 U.S. 94, 101-02 (1988) (holding that actions of a 
hospital peer review board are not state action and are not protected by 
the state action doctrine). 
83. Cal. Retail Liquor Dealers Ass’n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 
105 (1980). 
84. For example, in North Carolina Board of Dental Examiners v. FTC, the 
Fourth Circuit held that “state agencies ‘in which a decisive coalition 
(usually a majority) is made up of participants in the regulated market,’ 
who are chosen by and accountable to their fellow market participants, 
are private actors and must meet both Midcal prongs.” 717 F.3d 359, 
368 (2013) (agreeing with the FTC’s determination and citing Phillip E. 
Areeda & Herbert Hovenkamp, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF 
ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION 501 (3d ed. 2009). See 
also F.T.C. v. Monahan, 832 F.2d 688, 690 (1st Cir. 1987) (denying ipso 
facto immunity); Mass. Bd. of Registration in Optometry, 110 F.T.C. 
549, 612-13 (1988) (holding that the state optometry board is “not 
entitled to immunity as the sovereign” and that there is no clear 
articulation of intent to displace competition in authorizing statute). 
But see Green v. State Bar of Tex., 27 F.3d 1083, 1087 (5th Cir. 1994) 
(holding that the state’s Unauthorized Practice of Law Committee was 
immune from scrutiny). Then-Judge Breyer, writing for the majority in 
FTC v. Monahan, held that both clear legislative articulation and active 
supervision are required when board activity comprises “essentially” 
private action and that “[w]hether any ‘anticompetitive’ Board activities 
are ‘essentially’ those of private parties depends upon how the Board 
functions in practice, and perhaps upon the role played by its members. 
. . .” 832 F.2d at 689-90. The Supreme Court, as noted above, has 
plainly held that other types of independent, but statutorily-created, 
health care authorities may be subject to federal antitrust scrutiny. 
Phoebe Putney Heath System, Inc., 133 S.Ct. at 1007. 
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traditional police powers and, as such, immune from federal antitrust 
scrutiny under the state action doctrine.85 If a private trade associa-
tion recommends such barriers to entry to the legislature, the request 
itself may be protected under the Noerr-Pennington doctrine. In 
either case, competition advocacy might nonetheless raise the question 
whether some particular proposed requirement seems excessive, under-
rationalized, or baseless as a health and safety protection and sub-
stantial as a barrier to entry. A similar substantive standard, if set by 
an independent regulatory board under a general grant of authority 
from the state, may not receive the same deference.86 Enactment of a 
licensing scheme may entail (and hence render “foreseeable”) some 
barriers to entry in professional services markets. The doctrine 
imposes, however, both “procedural and substantive limitations on 
the state’s ability to confer antitrust immunity.”87 Depending on the 
particular facts and circumstances at issue, such standards may be 
questioned in the course of competition advocacy, subject to law 
enforcement scrutiny, or both.88  
85. This is not to evaluate any particular piece of legislation. The general 
principle that acts of a state legislature are valid, except insofar as they 
exceed the legislature’s powers under the federal Constitution, is 
articulated in Parker itself. 317 U.S. at 350-51. See also Hoover v. 
Ronwin, 466 U.S. 558, 567-68 (1984). The idea that state legislatures 
can regulate commerce through health laws dates to Gibbons v. Ogden. 
22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 71 (1824). See also Wilson v. Black Bird Creek 
Marsh Co., 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 245, 249-50 (1829). 
86. Although there may be some lack of uniformity across the U.S. Courts 
of Appeals on the question of when such regulators may be accorded 
state action immunity, it is well settled that there are circumstances 
under which state regulatory boards – and certainly an independent 
board comprised substantially of financially interested parties or 
members of the profession regulated by the board in question – are not 
themselves sovereign and hence may be subject to federal antitrust 
scrutiny. See, e.g., Goldfarb v. Va. State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 791 (1975). 
See also Monahan, 832 F.2d at 689-90; Mass. Bd. of Registration in 
Optometry, 110 F.T.C. at 612-13. 
87. William H. Page & John E. Lopatka, State Regulation in the Shadow of 
Antitrust: FTC v Ticor Title Ins. Co., 3 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 189, 219 
(1993) (discussing the active supervision prong of Midcal in the wake of 
F.T.C. v. Ticor Title Insurance Co. and analogizing state action 
doctrine to the general antitrust approach to ancillary restraints). 
88. Numerous competition advocacy comments have been submitted to 
executive agencies and independent regulatory boards authorized by 
state legislation, and such comments may be issued independently of the 
question whether a given agency may be subject to Midcal’s two 
pronged-test. A particular set of facts may give rise to law enforcement, 
private antitrust litigation, and competition advocacy. Compare 
Complaint, State Volunteer Mutual Ins. Co., Inc., Docket No. C-3115, 
102 F.T.C. 1232 (Sept. 28, 1983) (alleging violation of Section 5), with 
Brief of FTC as Amicus Curiae, Nurse Midwifery Assocs. v. Hibbett, 
918 F.2d 605 (6th Cir. 1990). 
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II. Discussion 
A. Competition, Licensure, and Scope of Practice 
For the health care professions, licensure and scope of practice 
regulations are two sides of the same coin: licensure restricts entry (or 
ongoing participation) in a given profession, and scope-of-practice 
restrictions help describe the metes-and-bounds of licensure – what a 
given professional license permits a person to do and, often, prohibits 
others from doing.89 In that regard, general competition considerations 
for licensure may provide a useful baseline when considering the 
potential costs and benefits of particular scope of practice restrictions. 
First, professional licensure works as a barrier to entry when it works 
at all.90 That is not necessarily a bad thing: not all barriers to entry 
are substantial or durable, much less excessive or unlawful, and it 
does not follow from the very nature of licensure that it necessarily is 
anticompetitive, fails to provide consumer benefits, or fails, on 
balance, to be cost-justified.91 On the other hand, any particular 
licensing regime or provision may evidence any or all of those failings. 
 
89. Plainly, a complete code specification for medical or nursing practice is 
likely intractable, if not impossible. Scope of practice tends to be defined 
partly in the breach and partly through an admixture of general and 
specific categories of permitted and excluded conduct across statutory 
law, regulation, administration, and litigation. Perhaps equally plain is 
that scope of practice rules are not the only legal or regulatory 
restrictions on professional practice. Diverse provisions running from, 
e.g., the Stark anti-kickback law, 42 U.S.C. §1320a-7b(b)(2012) and 
implementing regulations at 42 C.F.R. §1001.952 (2010) to HIPAA 
privacy rules, Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act 
(HIPAA), 45 C.F.R. pts. 160, 164 (2013), all serve to constrain practice 
in various ways. State law tort claims may rest on a much broader set 
of issues than licensure or scope of practice per se. 
90. Licensure is a process that guards entry into an occupation and requires 
the license seeker to obtain the permission of a government agency 
before providing professional services in that agency’s jurisdiction. 
Typically, the state licensing authority requires the license-seeker to 
demonstrate a minimum degree of competence in turn. See Joint 
Hearing on Health Care and Competition Law and Policy Before the 
FTC and Dep’t of Justice 33-34 (Jun. 10, 2003), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public_events/health
-care-competition-law-policy-hearings/030610ftctrans.pdf (statement of 
Dr. Morris Kleiner); George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic 
Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 3, 18-20 (1971) (providing a 
general account of the “capture theory” of regulation applied to 
professionals’ interest in limiting entry via licensure). 
91. Adriana D. Kugler & Robert M. Sauer, Doctors without Borders? 
Relicensing Requirements and Negative Selection in the Market for 
Physicians, 23 J. LAB. ECON. 437, 438 (2005) (“Licensing may improve 
the average quality of service offered by practitioners when the entry of 
less competent practitioners is prevented or when less competent 
practitioners are forced to increase their investments in human 
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Licensure also can be an efficient response to several potential 
types of market failure such as when there are information asymme-
tries between professionals and consumers and quality information is 
costly;92 when externalities are striking;93 or when professionals play 
the dual roles of diagnostician and treatment provider. 94 In health 
care, market failure sometimes implicates health and safety concerns. 
For example, to the extent that lower-quality care entails significant 
health or safety risks, consumers may be subject to poorer outcomes 
associated with those risks, and providers may have less incentive to 
minimize those risks when providing quality information is costly.95 
Licensure may not cure this problem, but it can provide consumers 
with some critical quality information by setting and certifying 
 
capital.”). See also Keith B. Leffler, Physician Licensure: Competition 
and Monopoly in American Medicine, 21 J.L. & ECON. 165, 166, 185-86 
(1978) (examining approaches to physician licensure and finding “no 
clear answer” to the question of who benefits from the medical 
profession’s licensure requirements). 
92. For example, various ratings and patterns of referral notwithstanding, it 
may be very difficult for consumers to assess the relative quality of 
competing physician services (or services competing with physician 
services). If so, some professionals may be insulated against the 
competitive disadvantages of offering lower quality services while others 
may be unable to capture the gains associated with higher quality 
services. See, e.g., COX & FOSTER, supra note 42, at 5-6. Cf. Hayne E. 
Leland, Quacks, Lemons, and Licensing: A Theory of Minimum Quality 
Standards, 87 J. POL. ECON. 1328, 1329 (1979). 
93. COX & FOSTER, supra note 42, at 9-10. 
94. Id. at 11. Health care law deals with special cases of this, as in 
restricting physician ownership of certain diagnostic facilities. However, 
the concern is more general, as patients typically rely on service 
providers to recommend further services. Especially when there are 
third-party payers, when pricing is per service, and when the service is 
highly technical, there may be a bias toward overconsumption: providers 
may tend to offer more services than necessary to consumers who often 
are poorly equipped to evaluate the marginal value of additional services 
and are insulated from some of the costs of overconsumption. James C. 
Cooper, Public Versus Private Restraints on the Online Distribution of 
Contact Lenses: A Distinction with a Difference, 3 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 
331, 343-44 (2007).  
95. For example, at the extreme, consumers may be unable to identify 
substantial risks of morbidity or mortality when, e.g., they lack 
information on impaired providers or hospitals with unusually high post-
operative infection rates. See A DOSE OF COMPETITION, supra note 19, at 
17-21 (regarding the broader competitive problem of information costs 
and asymmetries in health care). Regulation against fatal risks is a 
classical justification for regulatory costs more generally. See, e.g., 
RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 383-84 (6th ed. 2003). 
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minimum quality standards or qualifications regarded as proxies for 
such standards.96  
At the same time, licensure may be used by incumbent profes-
sionals to insulate themselves from competition.97 By restricting the 
entry of competitors, licensure can restrict supply, which can increase 
the income of incumbents (at consumer expense) or decrease the 
pressure on incumbents to improve non-price aspects of their services, 
such as quality or convenience.98 On this model, licensure is not an 
 
96. See, e.g., Kenneth J. Arrow, Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of 
Medical Care, 53 AM. ECON. REV. 941, 966 (1963) (noting licensure may 
increase consumer confidence in the quality of the licensed service). 
That is, licensure may specify educational, training, or other entry 
requirements that may be associated or presumed associated with a 
quality floor. We are agnostic with respect to the question of what such 
requirements ought to be for physicians or APRNs. There is also an 
open question of whether there is any empirical basis to suppose that 
particular requirements are associated with a particular quality of care 
or diminution of risk. Cf. Leland, supra note 92, at 1342 (1979) (noting 
that in markets with asymmetric information, minimum quality 
constraints or licensing may be welfare-enhancing, although they are not 
the first-best solution, but where constraints are set by a regulated 
industry or profession, standards are likely to be set too high). 
97. To be clear, we are not suggesting that the larger population of 
physicians cynically or consciously seeks to raise their income and 
suppress APRN income via licensure and scope of practice restrictions. 
Rather, to the extent that such restrictions are in the economic self-
interest of some physicians, those physicians might be biased in favor of 
such policies. Other factors, such as historically entrenched forms of 
training and care delivery, dated or erroneous beliefs about the training 
or performance of unfamiliar professions, or even professional bias, may 
contribute to advocacy on behalf of excessive APRN regulation. See, 
e.g., IOM FUTURE OF NURSING REPORT, supra note 1, at 27, 107-14; 
Barbara J. Safriet, Federal Options for Maximizing the Value of 
Advanced Practice Nurses in Providing Quality, Cost-Effective Health 
Care, in IOM FUTURE OF NURSING REPORT, supra note 1, at 451-57. 
Moreover, pro- and anticompetitive models of licensure may 
simultaneously apply to any particular set of licensing requirements and 
scope of practice restrictions. To suppose that a given bundle of 
restrictions comprises both certain baseline standards that ameliorate 
likely market failure and others that impose undue costs is hardly 
incoherent.  
98. Stigler, supra note 90, at 13-14 (discussing the income variable in 
professional licensing). See also COX & FOSTER, supra note 42, at 18-20 
(arguing that income is a significant factor in professionals’ desire for 
regulation via licensing); Morris M. Kleiner, Occupational Licensing, 14 
J. ECON. PERSP. 189, 192 (2000) (“The most generally held view on the 
economics of occupational licensing is that it restricts the supply of 
labor to the occupation and thereby drives up the price of labor as well 
as of services rendered.”). This approach to licensure is generally 
consistent with what has also been called “the economic theory of 
regulation” (ETR). See generally Cooper et al., supra note 40 
(discussing competition advocacy and ETR); Sam Peltzman, Toward a 
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efficient response to market failure but an example of legislative or 
regulatory “capture” by concentrated professional interests.99 Recent 
research results are “consistent with the hypothesized role by mem-
bers of an occupation to raise wages by using the powers of 
government to drive up requirements and capture work for the 
regulated workers for larger geographic areas.”100  
Licensure and scope of practice regulations thus have a consumer 
protection101 rationale that we cannot gainsay and, at the same time, 
may serve the more parochial interests of the very professionals whose 
conduct they govern. They may foster safe care by setting education, 
certification, and accreditation standards that assure patients (health 
care consumers) that a provider has a basic level of knowledge or skill 
(or by setting practice boundaries concomitant with that level of 
skill). However, regulations may provide that assurance only roughly 
or at substantial cost – say, by offering over-broad assurances about 
some service providers or over-broad restrictions on others, or by 
imposing excessive barriers to entry, whether into the profession, 
across professions,102 or across jurisdictional boundaries (such as state 
 
More General Theory of Regulation, 19 J.L. & ECON. 211, 213(1976); 
Gary S. Becker, A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for 
Political Influence, 98 Q.J. ECON. 371, 371-72 (1983).  
99. See Kleiner, supra note 98, at 192 (suggesting that members of 
professions use state legislatures or local governments to control entry 
via licensing); Stigler, supra note 90, at 13-18 (providing a detailed 
analysis of the manner in which members of an occupation can use 
political processes to improve their positions). 
100. Morris M. Kleiner & Alan B. Kreuger, Analyzing the Extent and 
Influence of Occupational Licensing on the Labor Market 24 (Nat’l 
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper 14979, 2011), available at 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w14979.pdf (finding substantially higher 
wages associated with licensure of a profession at the state or federal, 
instead of local, level, adjusting for educational attainment, age, 
experience, and other variables, consistent with a monopoly theory of 
licensure –a result that is not inconsistent with the claim that licensure 
may provide for higher quality services). 
101. See supra note 17 regarding our use of “consumer protection.” 
102. As noted already, special competition concerns may be raised when one 
group of competitors seeks to regulate another. In addition, although 
licensure may generally have an exclusive aspect, the question whether 
or to what extent one professional board may regulate the conduct of 
another profession sometimes raises complex legal questions under state 
law. See, e.g., Mo. Ass’n of Nurse Anesthetists v. State Bd. of 
Registration for the Healing Arts, 343 S.W.3d 348, 358 (Mo. 2011) 
(noting the Missouri board is “without authority to make policies, 
interpretations or determinations that define the scope of practice for 
APNs” under Missouri law). 
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lines).103 If so, they may provide fewer social benefits at greater cost 
than necessary. Perhaps in some cases, or for some professions, the 
light they shine on professional qualifications is not worth the can-
dle.104  
Both threads may be evident in the history of medical licensure. 
Certification of medical schools and the development of state licensure 
acts in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries were built on 
serious professional concerns about inadequate institutions and 
untrained practitioners, on public aspirations for better, less abusive, 
and safer medical treatment, and on a growing acceptance of science 
as the basis for medical care and education.105 The rise of licensure 
also comprised substantial jockeying for market share, with physicians 
sometimes lobbying jointly with, and sometimes against, other types 
of practitioners, such as homeopaths.106  
Of course, the present policy discussion does not present a stark 
choice between competing models of regulation,107 which are not 
mutually exclusive, or answer the question whether to maintain or 
 
103. See, e.g., Daniel J. Gilman, Physician Licensure and Telemedicine: 
Some Competitive Issues Raised by the Prospect of Practicing Globally 
While Regulating Locally, 14 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 87, 89 (2011) 
(regarding some of the costs of state line barriers imposed by non-
portable physician licensure). 
104. The suggestion is not often made with regard to physician or nursing 
licensure in particular, and we do not make it here. But see generally 
Daniel B. Hogan, The Effectiveness of Licensing: History, Evidence, and 
Recommendations, 7 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 117, 117 (1983) (arguing that 
licensure has not effectively accomplished its purpose and that there 
may be more efficient means to provide for minimum standards and 
curtail quackery); Charles H. Baron, Licensure of Health Care 
Professionals: The Consumer’s Case for Abolition, 9 AM. J.L. & MED. 
335, 341-42 (1983) (arguing licensure has failed to produce lasting net 
benefits in quality and has led to increased health care costs). 
105. For a general account, see W.F. Bynum et al., The Rise of Science in 
Medicine, 1850-1913, in THE WESTERN MEDICAL TRADITION 1800-2000, 
at 132-35, 165-75 (2006); see also Clinton Sandvick, Enforcing Medical 
Licensing in Illinois: 1877-1890, 82 YALE J. BIO. & MED. 67 (2009). The 
ability of the states to set forth criteria for licensure was upheld by the 
Supreme Court in Dent v. West Virginia. 129 U.S. 114, 124 (1889) 
(holding there is no deprivation of due process in generally applicable 
licensing criteria that are not arbitrary but adopted and enforced by 
established means). 
106. See Bynum et al., supra note 105, at 132-35, 165-75. 
107. “When properly designed . . . occupational licensing can protect the 
public’s health and safety by increasing the quality of professionals’ 
services through mandatory entry requirements . . . . At the same time, 
many occupational licensing restrictions do not appear to realize the 
goal of increasing the quality of professionals’ services.” COX & FOSTER, 
supra note 42, at v. 
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abandon licensure for physician or nursing practice generally.108 
Rather, examining the competitive impact of licensure regulations 
helps sharpen our focus on the benefits and costs associated with our 
present regulations and the likely marginal effects of potential changes 
to those rules on competition and health care consumers. For exam-
ple, some research regarding state dentistry regulations suggests that 
increasingly stringent licensing requirements may not be associated 
with better dental health outcomes but may be associated with fewer 
dentists per capita.109 That does not impugn the general notion of 
licensure for dentists but does call into question whether certain 
strictures provide any net benefits, much less adequate ones, to offset 
their competitive costs.110 Regarding APRNs, there also is some 
evidence that relatively stringent scope of practice rules are associated 
with fewer per capita practitioners.111 Again, that does not suggest 
wholesale repudiation of scope of practice limits but does suggest that 
we carefully examine the countervailing health and safety benefits 
that may (or may not be) associated with particular policies. 
At the most general level, relaxing the regulatory limits on APRN 
scope of practice should tend to increase the supply of providers who 
are willing and able to offer certain services at any given price. This 
frequently is termed a “supply expansion.”112 In underserved areas and 
 
108. But see Hogan, supra note 104, at 117. 
109. Morris M. Kleiner & Robert T. Kudrle, Does Regulation Effect 
Economic Outcomes? The Case of Dentistry, 43 J. L. & ECON. 547, 575-
76 (2000). But see ARLENE HOLEN, CTR. FOR NAVAL ANALYSES, THE 
ECONOMICS OF DENTAL LICENSING 21 (1978), available at 
http://www.cna.org/sites/default/files/research/0203440000.pdf (finding 
some positive correlation between stringency of certain dental rules and 
a proxy for quality of care – lower average malpractice insurance rates – 
although reaching no conclusions about net benefits). Here too, we must 
be careful to distinguish two distinct claims: Kleiner and Kudrle’s 
observation –that certain more stringent licensing requirements are not 
associated with improved health care outcomes –is not a claim that 
there are no quality gains associated with an initial move to establish 
minimum licensure standards for dentists. In fact, no such regulatory 
transition was examined (not least because, in the period studied, all 
states required licensure for the practice of dentistry). See Kliener & 
Kurdrle, supra, at 576.  
110. Kliener & Kurdrle, supra 109, at 576. 
111. Edward S. Sekscenski et al., State Practice Environments and the 
Supply of Physician Assistants, Nurse Practitioners, and Certified 
Nurse-Midwives, 331 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1266, 1266 (1994).  
112. Either of two sorts of regulatory changes will tend to have the same 
directional effect on supply. First, to the extent that scope of practice 
rules change to permit APRNs to deliver a given type of service 
previously prohibited to them, the population of providers increases. 
Second, when the APRN scope of practice already includes a given 
service, but the regulatory costs of APRN service provision are lowered 
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for underserved populations, the benefits of expanding supply are 
clear. Even in well-served areas, the supply expansion will tend to 
lower prices for any given quantity demanded, thus lowering 
healthcare costs.113 Conversely, additional and unnecessary restrictions 
impose a supply contraction where access problems are more likely to 
be exacerbated and some patients deprived of basic care. 
There remains the larger question of how to incorporate a compe-
tition analysis into a regulatory discussion of health and safety policy 
issues. Some form of cost-benefit analysis might be helpful in both 
framing and evaluating a policy proposal. Health care antitrust law 
frequently wrestles with the question of how to account for potential 
pro-consumer efficiencies, which may include qualitative improve-
ments in care, when evaluating mergers or conduct under the rule of 
reason.114 At some level, any evaluation of potential efficiencies or 
inefficiencies in health care must account for quality of care, if only 
via a tacit assumption, in discussions focused on price or output, that 
quality remains constant. Acknowledging important work on market 
concentration and health care quality,115 antitrust tends not to grapple 
with healthcare safety or risk management details.116  
 
(e.g., by removing particular physician supervision requirements), the 
supply of professionals willing to offer those services at any given price 
also increases. 
113. The National Governors Association (NGA) emphasized APRNs’ critical 
role in expanding access to care. NAT’L GOVERNORS ASS’N, THE ROLE OF 
NURSE PRACTITIONERS IN MEETING INCREASING DEMAND FOR PRIMARY 
CARE 11 (2012), available at 
http://www.nga.org/files/live/sites/NGA/files/pdf/1212NursePractition
ersPaper.pdf (“Expanded utilization of NPs has the potential to increase 
access to health care, particularly in historically underserved areas.”). 
114. See, e.g., Statement of Antitrust Enforcement Policy Regarding 
Accountable Care Organizations Participating in the Medicare Shared 
Savings Program, 76 Fed. Reg. 67026 (Oct. 28, 2011); DOJ & FTC 
POLICY STATEMENTS, supra note 66, at 35 (acknowledging potential 
efficiencies that may incorporate improvements in patient safety). 
Advisory opinions have considered, e.g., whether joint conduct may 
enhance providers’ potential to meet quality of care benchmarks. See, 
e.g., Letter from Markus H. Meier, Asst. Dir., FTC, to Christi J. Braun 
and John J. Miles (Sept. 17, 2007), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/bc/adops/gripa.pdf. 
115. See Martin Gaynor & Robert J. Town, Competition in Health Care 
Markets 50-82 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper 17208, 
2011), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w17208 (providing a 
very useful discussion and literature review). 
116. Quality metrics raise complex and often contentious issues that both 
parties to a controversy might choose to set aside. For various reasons, 
competition analysis of various qualitative factors may often appear thin 
and tends to defer to extra-competitive metrics. See, e.g., Statement of 
Antitrust Enforcement Policy Regarding Accountable Care 
Organizations Participating in the Medicare Shared Savings Program, 
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If we ask about the extent to which society ought to trade some 
improvement in health outcomes (Oa > Ob) for some increase in the 
cost of entry (Ea > Eb), then part of our question has to do with basic 
social welfare values and the extent to which society is willing to pay 
for them. In practice, that is sometimes the question when we want 
antitrust analysis to step aside, in favor of a broader policy discus-
sion.117 But this does not mean that such policy discussions ought to 
lose track of the competitive costs of the policies at issue any more 
than they ought to ignore implementation or compliance costs. One 
type of limiting case should be clear: when countervailing consumer 
benefits are nil, non-trivial competitive costs – like non-trivial 
regulatory costs more generally – are not justified, and highly specula-
tive (or poorly demonstrated) countervailing benefits are, at best, 
highly speculative (or poorly demonstrated) justifications.118  
Similar arguments have developed through a consistent judicial 
refusal, since National Society of Professional Engineers, to consider 
speculative consumer protection rationales adequate to defend private 
anticompetitive behavior.119 In Professional Engineers, the Court 
categorically refused to countenance an argument that competition 
itself poses a “potential threat . . . to the public safety” and profes-
sional ethics.120 Following that decision, both the FTC and the 
 
76 Fed. Reg. 67026 (Oct. 28, 2011) (referring to CMS eligibility criteria 
and monitoring for ACOs). Cf. Peter J. Hammer & William M. Sage, 
Antitrust, Health Care Quality, and the Courts, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 
545, 548 (2002) (“[W]hile courts deal assertively with health antitrust 
cases and employ standard economic tools in their analyses, they seldom 
address quality as a specific competitive dimension, rather than as a 
regulatory matter.”); Douglas Ginsburg, Nonprice Competition, 38 
ANTITRUST BULLETIN 83, 83 (1993). 
117. Cf. Hammer & Sage, supra note 116, at 548 (“[W]hile courts deal 
assertively with health antitrust cases and employ standard economic 
tools in their analyses, they seldom address quality as a specific 
competitive dimension, rather than as a regulatory matter.”). 
118. The policy argument, as explained in the paragraph immediately 
following, also has a juristic analogue in National Society of Professional 
Engineers v. United States and its progeny. 435 U.S. 679 (1978). It also 
may be analogized to the antitrust treatment of ancillary restraints in 
private commerce. See, e.g., ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST 
PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF 28 (1978) (discussing Judge 
Taft’s opinion, in Addyston Pipe & Steel v. United States, 175 U.S. 211 
(1899), as comprising an insight that “is, or should be, central to 
modern antitrust”). “[E]ven restraints ancillary in form would be illegal 
if they were part of a general plan to gain monopoly control of a 
market.” Id. 
119. Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs, 435 U.S. at 695 (“Exceptions to the 
Sherman Act for potentially dangerous goods and services would be 
tantamount to a repeal of the statute.”).  
120. Id. 
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Supreme Court rejected putative health and safety justifications for 
anticompetitive conduct in Indiana Federation of Dentists.121 There, 
mere opinion testimony about potential health and safety concerns – 
proffered as offsetting “noncompetitive” benefits – was deemed 
inadequate to defend joint or concerted anticompetitive conduct in a 
case where no evidence of actual consumer harm or any systematic 
evidence of substantial consumer risk had been presented.122 As the 
Fourth Circuit put it in a case involving supervision requirements for 
clinical psychologists, “Forewarned by the decision in National Society 
of Professional Engineers . . . that it is not the function of a group of 
professionals to decide that competition is not beneficial in their line 
of work, we are not inclined to condone anticompetitive conduct upon 
an incantation of ‘good medical practice.’”123  
B. The Nursing Advocacies 
The FTC competition advocacy program has applied this frame-
work in considering the likely competitive impact of proposed changes 
to various occupational regulations. APRNs, like other health care 
professionals, are subject to various categories of state regulation. In 
all states and the District of Columbia, APRNs face licensure re-
quirements that determine who may enter the profession.124 Related 
scope of practice rules further define the types of services APRNs may 
provide and the extent to which they may practice independently.125 
While entry qualifications for APRNs are increasingly common from 
state to state, the regulations that define APRN scope of practice 
continue to vary widely.126 Some scope of practice restrictions are 
procedure-oriented, limiting APRNs’ ability to prescribe medicines; 
refer for, order, or perform certain tests or procedures; or treat certain 
indications.127 Other restrictions focus on the types of patients APRNs 
 
121. FTC v. Ind. Fed’n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447 (1986). 
122. Id. at 463-64. This is a lower bar or limiting case: it does not follow that 
antitrust demands any particular level of substantiation or that 
antitrust concerns evaporate in the presence of any demonstrable 
consumer risk. 
123. Va. Acad. of Clinical Psychologists v. Blue Shield of Va., 624 F.2d 476, 
485 (4th Cir. 1980). 
124. For a general discussion of these and other types of professional 
regulations, see, e.g., COX & FOSTER, supra note 42. 
125. TRACY YEE ET AL., NAT’L INST. FOR HEALTH CARE REFORM, PRIMARY 
CARE WORKFORCE SHORTAGES: NURSE PRACTITIONER SCOPE-OF-
PRACTICE LAWS AND PAYMENT POLICIES 2 (2013), available at 
http://www.nihcr.org/PCP-Workforce-NPs. 
126. IOM FUTURE OF NURSING REPORT, supra note 1, at 98. See also NAT’L 
GOVERNORS ASS’N, supra note 113, at 2. 
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may see. For example, APRNs may not be allowed to “examine a new 
patient, or a current patient with a major change in diagnosis or 
treatment plan, unless the patient is seen and examined by a super-
vising physician within a specified period of time.”128 
In addition, more than half of U.S. states maintain physician su-
pervision requirements for APRNs.129 In other words, besides limits on 
the types of patients APRNs may see or the types of procedures 
APRNs may perform, these states’ scope of practice rules restrict the 
degree to which APRNs may practice independently. Supervision may 
be required for all APRN practice130 or for particular practice activi-
ties such as prescribing medications.131  
Advocacy has been viewed as a response to the economic theory 
of regulation (ETR). ETR “posits that because of relatively high 
organizational and transaction costs, consumers will be disadvantaged 
relative to businesses in securing favorable regulation,”132 and advoca-
cy comprises a sort of regulatory self-monitoring that may partly 
offset that comparative disadvantage. Competition advocacy can 
identify and make public both the competitive advantages sought by 
particular businesses and the potential impact of those advantages on 
 
127. For example, under Florida law, an APRN may “[m]onitor and alter 
drug therapies” but may not prescribe controlled substances. FLA. STAT. 
§§ 464.012(3)(a), 83902(2), 8390.5(1) (2013) (restricting controlled 
substance prescription to certain “practitioners” and defining 
practitioners to include physicians, but not APRNs). 
128. IOM FUTURE OF NURSING REPORT, supra note 1, at 101. The report 
catalogues various regulatory restrictions on nursing practice. Id. at 100-
02 fig. 3-1, 157-61. 
129. See id. at 157-61 (specifying state-by-state requirements for supervision 
or mandatory “collaborative practice” for APRN treatment, diagnosis, 
or prescribing). According to the National Council of State Boards of 
Nursing, twenty-seven states require supervision or a collaborative 
practice agreement for APRN practice. See APRN Maps, supra note 9 
(reporting that twenty-two states plus District of Columbia permit 
independent practice).  
130. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 464.012(3) (2013) (providing that an APRN can 
perform functions within her scope of practice only after “entering into a 
supervisory relationship with a physician” and subsequently filing 
established practice protocol with the regulator); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
37:913(8) (2012) (requiring a formal written collaborative practice 
agreement for both “acts of medical diagnosis and prescription”). 
131. See APRN Maps, supra note 9; see also, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
37:913(8) (2012) (requiring a formal collaborative practice agreement for 
prescribing); W.Va. CODE §§ 30-7-15(a)-(b) (2013) (requiring a signed 
collaborative practice agreement with physician for APRN prescribing). 
132. Cooper et al., supra note 40, at 1092 n.4 (citing W. KIP VISCUSI ET AL., 
ECONOMICS OF REGULATION AND ANTITRUST 313-35 (2000)). 
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consumers.133 Particular questions have been raised about regulatory 
restrictions that one group of professional competitors (physicians or 
specialist physicians) may impose on another (APRNs or CRNAs), 
either directly (as when physicians dominate or wholly constitute an 
independent board of regulation)134 or indirectly (as where physicians 
or physician groups lobby for statutory restrictions).135 
Although recent advocacies are salient, FTC concerns about po-
tentially undue restrictions on health care professionals date back 
several decades.136 For example, 1985 comments before the District of 
Columbia Council expressed concern about the potential over-
regulation of “expanded role nurses” and, in particular, about undue 
supervision requirements for Certified Registered Nurse Anesthetists 
(CRNAs).137 Not incidentally, the general thrust of those 1985 staff 
comments presaged the IOM’s present policy concerns: 
In view of the potential benefits of the practice of expanded role 
nurses in conformance with their education, training, and expe-
rience, we believe that any [provisions] that might unnecessarily 
restrict these professionals in their work with physicians, or un-
 
133. Id. 
134. See supra note 84 and accompanying text. 
135. See, e.g., Hearing on Review of West Virginia Laws Governing the 
Scope of Practice for Advanced Practice Registered Nurses and 
Consideration of Possible Revisions to Remove Practice Restrictions 
before Subcomm. A of the Joint Comm. on Health, W. Va. Legislature 
(W. Va. 2008) (statement of Am. Med. Ass’n), available at 
http://www.ama-assn.org/resources/doc/arc/ama-letter-ftc-wv.pdf; 
Letter from Am. Soc’y of Anesthesiologists to Susan S. DeSanti et al., 
Dirs. of Bureau of Econ., FTC (Jan. 19, 2011) [hereinafter Am. Soc’y of 
Anesthesiologists Letter], available at http://www.asahq.org/For-
Members/Advocacy/Washington-
Alerts/~/media/For%20Members/Advocacy/ASA%20in%20Washington
/ASA%20FTC%20Pain%20letter%201-19-11.ashx. 
136. See Med. Staff of Mem. Med Ctr., 110 F.T.C. 541 at *1-2 (1998) 
(consent order) (addressing allegations of anticompetitive combination 
or conspiracy to deny credentials to nurse midwife); FTC D.C. 
Comment, supra note 48. 
137. See generally FTC D.C. Comment, supra note 48. Also, in 1988 the 
Commission filed an amicus brief in an antitrust suit against State 
Volunteer Medical Insurance Company, a physician-owned malpractice 
insurance company, and against certain hospitals and doctors, alleging 
that the defendants unlawfully acted in concert to prevent the 
establishment of independent nurse-midwifery practice in Tennessee, 
and thereby unreasonably restrained competition in the provision of 
obstetrical care, in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act. Brief of 
FTC as Amicus Curiae, State Volunteer Mut. Ins. Corp., 102 F.T.C. 
1232, 1232 (1983). That advocacy, in the form of an amicus brief, was 
related to a prior law enforcement action involving related facts and a 
common defendant.  
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necessarily limit the procedures that they are allowed to per-
form, should be analyzed very carefully.138  
Staff suggested, in particular, that:  
mandating the physical presence of an anesthesiologist whenever 
services are provided by a nurse anesthetist . . . regardless of 
the circumstances or necessity for such supervision . . . likely 
would raise the cost of anesthesia services and possibly make 
them more difficult to obtain.139  
Although more recent nursing-related advocacies from the FTC 
and its staff address more complex policy considerations, the core 
competition arguments are the same and are perhaps – from an 
antitrust perspective – so simple as to be uninteresting. Certain 
impediments to competition (barriers to entry in particular) are 
identified; if the impediments are not trivial, we move to the question 
whether they are justified by countervailing consumer health or safety 
benefits or other pro-consumer efficiencies.140 
Since 2010 those issues have been raised in a series of FTC staff 
comments that address roughly three sets of regulations: (1) those 
imposing supervision requirements on APRNs, including those 
requiring that APRNs enter into formal written “collaborative 
practice” agreements with physicians as a condition of offering 
services otherwise within the APRNs’ scope of practice;141 (2) those 
limiting the abilities of CRNAs to provide interventional pain treat-
ment;142 and (3) those that restrict practice in limited service or 
 
138. FTC D.C. Comment, supra note 48, at 3. 
139. Id. at 7-8. 
140. GILMAN & KOSLOV, supra note 16. Cf. FTC v. Ind. Fed’n of Dentists, 
476 U.S. 447, 459 (1986) (quoting Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United 
States, 435 U.S. 679, 692 (1978)) (“‘[N]o elaborate industry analysis is 
required to demonstrate the anticompetitive character of such an 
agreement.’ . . . Absent some countervailing procompetitive virtue . . . 
such an agreement limiting consumer choice by impeding the ‘ordinary 
give and take of the market place,’ . . . cannot be sustained under the 
Rule of Reason.”).  
141. See 2007 Massachusetts FTC Letter, supra note 47; West Virginia 
Testimony, supra note 48; Kentucky FTC Letter to Hornback, supra 
note 48; Texas FTC Letter, supra note 48; Florida FTC Letter, supra 
note 48. 
142. See Missouri CRNA Letter, supra note 50; Tennessee FTC Letter to 
Odom, supra note 50; Alabama FTC Letter, supra note 50; 2007 
Massachusetts FTC Letter, supra note 47 (addressing nurse anesthetist 
(or CRNA) supervision requirements, but many of these have to do with 
core anesthesia and pain management procedures in surgical and 
perioperative settings). 
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“retail” clinics, which typically are staffed by APRNs.143 In no case 
has the FTC or its staff sought to specify an ideal or recommended 
scope of practice for APRNs.144 Underlying all of them was a concern 
that existing or proposed restrictions on APRN scope of practice 
appeared to be overbroad, under-rationalized, or both. 
1. APRN Regulations 
FTC staff comments on a 2012 Louisiana bill are illustrative of 
the competitive concerns associated with APRN supervision require-
ments.145 Louisiana law requires that an APRN must practice under a 
formal written collaborative practice agreement if he or she is to work 
to the full extent of APRN scope of practice, including performing 
“acts of medical diagnosis and prescription” as otherwise permitted 
under Louisiana law.146 Physicians are not similarly required to 
collaborate with APRNs or other health care professionals.147 The bill 
in question would have removed the collaborative practice require-
 
143. See 2007 Massachusetts FTC Letter, supra note 47; Illinois FTC Letter, 
supra note 47; Kentucky FTC Letter to Hornback, supra note 48. 
144. Competition analysis and law enforcement generally tend to avoid 
stipulating such regulations just as they tend, on the private side, to 
eschew industrial planning. See, e.g., BORK, supra note 118, at 69-70 
(“The antitrust laws are wholly prohibitory and passive in nature, so 
that they are effective only to screen conduct that private parties 
themselves originate. Unlike many other laws, therefore, antitrust is 
wholly unable to serve values that must be implemented by requiring or 
inducing affirmative conduct which the self-interest or capabilities of 
private persons do not cause or permit them to undertake.”). 
145. Louisiana FTC Letter, supra note 13; Connecticut FTC Letter, supra 
note 48; 2014 Massachusetts FTC Letter, supra note 48. Although staff 
comments regarding APRN regulations in Florida, Texas, Kentucky, 
and West Virginia addressed somewhat varied restrictions, they all had 
to do with the basis for supervision requirements imposed on APRN 
practice. 
146. A collaborative practice agreement, required under Louisiana law, is “a 
formal written statement addressing the parameters of the collaborative 
practice which are mutually agreed upon by the advanced practice 
registered nurse and one or more licensed physicians or dentists . . . .” 
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 37:913(8)-(9) (2012). 
147. Such asymmetrical “collaborative practice” requirements may often 
amount to, and sometimes expressly require, supervision requirements. 
See Lauren E. Battaglia, Note, Supervision and Collaboration 
Requirements: the Vulnerability of Nurse Practitioners and Its 
Implications for Retail Health, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 1127, 1137-38 
(2010) (discussing the relationship between supervision and 
collaboration requirements). 
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ment for certain APRNs practicing in medically underserved areas or 
treating medically underserved populations.148 
The underlying empirical basis for the staff’s analysis was 
straightforward. First, staff noted both federal and state find-
ings of primary care provider and service shortages throughout 
much of the state: “Recent reports indicate that more than half 
of Louisiana’s population lives in a federally-designated Health 
Professional Shortage Area (HPSA). All 64 Louisiana Parishes 
contain HPSAs, and 53 entire Parishes comprise primary care 
shortage areas.”149 Such shortages were – and are – expected to 
persist150 and were linked to significant problems in health care 
access and delivery in Louisiana.151 Healthcare reform promised 
 
148. H.B. 951, 2012 Leg., Reg. Sess. (La. 2012), available at 
http://www.legis.la.gov/Legis/ViewDocument.aspx?d=780847.  
149. Louisiana FTC Letter, supra note 13, at nn. 25-28. See also LA. DEP’T 
HEALTH AND HOSPS., 2009 LOUISIANA HEALTH REPORT CARD 203 (2010), 
available at http://new.dhh.louisiana.gov/assets/oph/Center-
RS/healthstats/DHHHlthCreRprtCrd_2009.pdf; Guidelines for Primary 
Medical Care/Dental HPSA Designation, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH AND 
HUMAN SERVS., HEALTH RES. & SERVS. ADM’N, 
http://bhpr.hrsa.gov/shortage/hpsas/designationcriteria/medicaldentalh
psaguidelines.html (last visited Jan. 6, 2014) (providing a general 
description of HPSAs); Find Shortage Areas: HPSA by State & County, 
U.S. DEP’T HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., HEALTH RES. & SERVS. ADM’N, 
http://hpsafind.hrsa.gov/HPSASearch.aspx (last visited Jan. 6, 2014) 
[hereinafter Find Shortage Areas]; Health Insurance Coverage Status 
2008-2010, American Community Survey 3-Year Estimates, U.S. 
CENSUS BUREAU, 
http://factfinder2.census.gov/faces/tableservices/jsf/pages/productview.
xhtml?pid=ACS_10_3YR_S2701&prodType=table (last visited Jan. 6, 
2014). 
150. Louisiana FTC Letter, supra note 13, at 3 (citing KAISER COMM’N ON 
MEDICAID AND THE UNINSURED, IMPROVING ACCESS TO ADULT PRIMARY 
CARE IN MEDICAID: EXPLORING THE POTENTIAL ROLE OF NURSE 
PRACTITIONERS AND PHYSICIAN ASSISTANTS 1 (2011), available at 
http://www.kff.org/medicaid/upload/8167.pdf); U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH 
& HUMAN SERVS., HEALTH RES. AND SERVS. ADM’N, THE PHYSICIAN 
WORKFORCE: PROJECTIONS AND RESEARCH INTO CURRENT ISSUES 
AFFECTING SUPPLY AND DEMAND 70-74 ex. 51-53 (1998), [hereinafter 
HRSA PHYSICIAN WORKFORCE REPORT], available at 
http://bhpr.hrsa.gov/healthworkforce/reports/physwfissues.pdf. 
151. Louisiana FTC Letter, supra note 13, 3 nn. 7-8, 21-22 (“With respect to 
Louisiana specifically, the Louisiana Department of Health and 
Hospitals has observed that ‘[s]hortages affecting the accessibility and 
availability of primary-care physicians . . . pose a significant problem in 
the delivery of healthcare in Louisiana.’ Louisiana also faces a shortage 
of APRNs – as it does with other primary care professionals.”); Primary 
Care HPSA Map of Louisiana, LA. DEP’T HEALTH & HOSPS., 
http://new.dhh.louisiana.gov/assets/oph/pcrh/10-03-
2012_PC_MAP.jpg (last visited Jan. 6, 2014) (indicating primary care 
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in some regards to exacerbate the shortages as more Louisiana 
consumers gain health insurance and seek access to primary 
health care services.152  
Second, staff noted that APRNs might help to alleviate such 
shortages.153 APRNs – observed to be the fastest growing segment of 
the primary care professional workforce in the United States154 – 
already were providing primary care services throughout Louisiana, 
and in many other states, they were doing so without regulatory 
requirements of direct supervision or formal collaborative practice 
 
shortages in most of the state of Louisiana); LA. DEP’T HEALTH AND 
HOSPS., supra note 149, at 224-26 (describing large portion of the state 
as a “Health Professional Shortage Area” under Louisiana criteria and 
as MUA or MUP under federal criteria); Find Shortage Area, supra note 
149 (indicating shortage areas throughout Louisiana’s 64 Parishes using 
HRSA criteria). 
152. Louisiana FTC Letter, supra note 13, at 2 (citing LA. STATE BD. OF 
NURSING, LA. CTR. FOR NURSING, NURSING WORKFORCE DEMAND 
REPORT 1, 3 (2012)). Cf. HRSA PHYSICIAN WORKFORCE REPORT, supra 
note 150, at 70-74 (projecting increased shortages of specialists, 
including anesthesiologists, as well as primary care physicians, especially 
if public expectations and ability to pay for care increase). Several 
studies estimate the extent to which primary care provider shortages are 
likely to be exacerbated by health care reform, including the Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA). See, e.g., Adam N. 
Hofer et al., Expansion of Coverage Under the Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act and Primary Care Utilization, 89 MILBANK Q. 69, 
84 (2011) (estimating predicted demand for primary care utilization 
stimulated by PPACA and predicting a shortfall of 4,307 to 6,940 
primary care physicians in 2019, subject to “considerable” geographic 
variation); Elbert S. Huang & Kenneth Finegold, Seven Million 
Americans Live in Areas Where Demand for Primary Care May Exceed 
Supply by More Than 10 Percent, 32 HEALTH AFFS. 614, 614 (2013); 
Stephen M. Petterson et al., Projecting US Primary Care Physician 
Workforce Needs: 2010-2025, 10 ANNALS FAM. MED. 503, 506-07 (2012) 
(projecting 2025 shortfall of 52,000 primary care physicians based on 
increased coverage and, to greater extent, population growth and aging 
of population); Leighton Ku et al., The States’ Next Challenge – 
Securing Primary Care for Expanded Medicaid Populations, 364 NEW 
ENG. J. MED. 493, 493-94 (2011) (estimating state-by-state primary care 
needs based on projections for expanded Medicaid populations). All but 
one of the states that have thus-far received FTC staff comments 
regarding APRN or CRNA-related issues – Texas, Louisiana, Kentucky, 
Alabama, Florida, Tennessee, and Missouri – are projected to have 
greater than average “access challenge scores,” reflecting “higher than 
average Medicaid expansions relative to their current primary care 
capacity.” Id. at 494.  
153. Louisiana FTC Letter, supra note 13, at 3-4. 
154. See KAISER COMM’N ON MEDICAID AND THE UNINSURED, supra note 150, 
at 3. 
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agreements.155 APRNs make up a greater share of the primary care 
workforce in less densely populated, less urban, and lower income 
areas, as well as in HPSAs.156 Also, APRNs are more likely than 
primary care physicians to practice in underserved areas and to care 
for large numbers of minority patients, Medicaid beneficiaries, and 
uninsured patients.157 In Louisiana there were approximately 3,500 
licensed APRNs, and most of the state’s designated HPSAs contained 
practicing APRNs.158 Hence, the potential benefits associated with the 
bill appeared amplified in markets that, from a health care access 
perspective, are most disadvantaged. Correspondingly, competitive 
concerns about the costs of undue regulations might be greater in 
markets or areas where health care needs are greatest.  
Third, staff noted that the statutory requirement of a formal, 
written collaborative practice agreement could impede the ability of 
APRNs to help fill this gap (or meet this demand).159 There were at 
least ad hoc reports that some APRNs were paying very high fees to 
enter into and maintain collaborative practice agreements and that 
 
155. According to the CDC, by 2006, 11.9% of U.S. primary care visits were 
attended solely by a nurse practitioner (APRN or NMW) or physician 
assistant. ESTHER HING ET AL., NATIONAL AMBULATORY MEDICAL CARE 
SURVEY: 2006 OUTPATIENT DEPARTMENT SUMMARY 6 (2008), available at 
http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nhsr/nhsr004.pdf. See IOM FUTURE OF 
NURSING REPORT, supra note 1, at 96-103, 157-61 (regarding 
supervision). Sixteen states and the District of Columbia fully permit 
independent APRN practice, requiring neither physician-signed 
collaboration agreements nor any other form of formal physician 
supervision, a seventeenth (Utah) requires collaboration agreements only 
for Schedule II-III controlled substances, and an eighteenth (Colorado) 
generally permitting independent practice, but requiring a preceptor and 
mentoring period for new prescribers and a one-time signed plan. Id. at 
3-12 fig. 3-3. See also Consumer Access and Barriers to Primary Care 
Physician-Nurse Practitioner Restrictive Collaboration Requirements by 
State, INITIATIVE ON THE FUTURE OF NURSING, 
http://www.thefutureofnursing.org/sites/default/files/Image-
%20Restrictive%20Collaboration_1.jpg (last visited Apr. 15, 2014). 
156. See KAISER COMM’N ON MEDICAID AND THE UNINSURED, supra note 150, 
at 3; IOM FUTURE OF NURSING REPORT, supra note 1, at 107-08. 
157. Id.; Christine M. Everett et al., Division of Primary Care Services 
Between Physicians, Physician Assistants, and Nurse Practitioners for 
Older Patients with Diabetes, 70 MED. CARE RESEARCH REV. 531, 536-37 
(2013) (“Panels with PA/NPs as usual providers appear to have a 
higher proportion of socially complex patients, when defined according 
to poverty (Medicaid), disability, and comorbid dementia and 
depression.”). 
158. LA. STATE BD. OF NURSING, 2010 ANNUAL REP. 23 (2011), available at 
http://www.lsbn.state.la.us/Portals/1/Documents/annualreport/annual
report2010.pdf. 
159. Louisiana FTC Letter, supra note 13, at 2-4. 
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some practicing APRNs found it difficult to secure a replacement 
agreement and continue their treatment of patients when a collaborat-
ing physician retired, moved, or died.160 
The competition analysis was simpler still. An existing undersup-
ply – likely due, at least in part, to regulatory barriers to entry – 
appeared substantial.161 Reducing some of those barriers – in particu-
lar, the statutory requirement of a collaborative practice agreement 
for APRNs serving medically underserved areas or treating under-
served patient populations – could “improve access and consumer 
choice for primary care services, especially for rural and other under-
served populations.”162 In brief, reducing such barriers could increase 
the supply of service providers and lower average costs of production, 
at least for some basic primary care services. At the margin, in 
underserved areas, the effect could be the provision of services not 
otherwise available. Hence, “[g]iven the potential benefits of eliminat-
ing unwarranted impediments to APRN practice, [FTC staff] recom-
recommend[ed] that the Louisiana legislature seek to ensure that 
statutory limits on APRNs are no stricter than patient protection 
requires.”163 
Moreover, staff suggested that the bill could facilitate innovation 
in health care delivery.164 In fact, collaboration between APRNs and 
 
160. Connecticut FTC Letter, supra note 48, at 5 nn. 34, 37 (citing 
difficulties some APRNs faced in securing agreements and anecdotal 
evidence that high fees were demanded of other APRNs, including one 
case where a physician reportedly demanded seventy percent of an 
APRN’s reimbursements as compensation to enter into a collaborative 
practice agreement); Louisiana FTC Letter, supra note 13, at 2. See also 
West Virginia Testimony, supra note 48, at 5 n. 33; Kentucky FTC 
Letter to Hornback, supra note 48, at 4. We are not suggesting that 
conscious attempts to suppress independent APRN practice are the 
norm, any more than conscious attempts to charge supra-competitive 
prices. As noted above, the more general concern is that, freed from 
normal competitive constraints, the prices of such collaborative 
agreements will be biased upwards and the qualitative terms of such 
agreements will not. Moreover, even atypical or outlier physician 
demands can make a big impact in a highly underserved area, and there 
are at least ad hoc reports of striking demands made by particular 
“collaborating” physicians. Although the particular impact on supply or 
price in individual practice areas needs study, there is at least general 
evidence that relatively stringent scope of practice restrictions may 
restrict APRN supply at the state level. See Sekscenski et al., supra 
note 111, at 1266. 
161. Louisiana FTC Letter, supra note 13; supra notes 22-29 and 
accompanying text. 
162. Id. at 2. 
163. Id. 
164. Id. at 4. 
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MDs is common.165 Even in states that do not require any formal 
collaborative or supervisory arrangement, APRNs frequently consult 
with or refer patients to physicians, and many APRNs are employed 
by physician practices or institutional providers that privately 
implement various collaboration and oversight arrangements.166 Such 
collaboration may be highly varied, a locus of considerable innovation, 
and, often, uncontroversial.167 But statutory requirements may 
constrain, rather than implement, enable, or enhance such practices. 
For example, in tying collaboration to specific formal agreements 
between individual APRNs and individual physicians168 or restricting 
the number of APRNs with whom a physician may collaborate (or 
supervise),169 the state may constrain the ability of an institutional 
provider to experiment with flexible oversight and collaboration 
arrangements or to accommodate staffing changes across central and 
satellite facilities in real time (or its administrative facsimile).170 
 
165. See OTA HEALTH TECHNOLOGY CASE STUDY, supra note 62, at 13 tbl. 1-
2 (regarding diverse practice settings and collaboration); IOM FUTURE 
OF NURSING REPORT, supra note 1, at 23, 58-59, 65-67, 72-76. 
166. See id.; Julie Sochalski & Jonathan Weiner, Health Care System Reform 
and the Nursing Workforce: Matching Nursing Practice and Skills to 
Future Needs, Not Past Demands, in IOM FUTURE OF NURSING REPORT, 
supra note 1, at 375-400. 
167. See IOM FUTURE OF NURSING REPORT, supra note 1, at 92-94 (regarding 
APRN primary care initiatives at the Department of Veterans Affairs, 
Geisinger Health System, and Kaiser Permanente); ROBERT WOOD 
JOHNSON FOUND., HOW NURSES ARE SOLVING SOME OF PRIMARY CARE’S 
MOST PRESSING CHALLENGES (2012), available at 
http://www.rwjf.org/content/dam/files/rwjf-web-
files/Resources/2/cnf20120810.pdf (describing use of APRNs/NPs in 
HealthPartners’ “Care Model Process,” which employs standardized best 
practices and telemedicine to coordinate care, as well as public 
initiatives in Pennsylvania and Vermont). Cf. MITCHELL ET AL., supra 
note 68, at 13 (discussing diverse team approaches and innovation and 
noting that questions of team roles and leadership may often be less 
problematic in the field than when tied to policy debates about, e.g., 
scope of practice restrictions).  
168. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 37:913(3)(a) (2012); see also LA. ADMIN. CODE 
tit. 46, § 4505 (2006). 
169. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 458.348(4)(a)-(b) (2013) (restricting the number 
of offices primary and specialty care physicians may supervise); MO. 
CODE REGS. ANN. tit. 20, § 2150-5.100 (2010) (allowing no more than 
three APRNs per collaborating medical doctor). 
170. Louisiana specifies relatively few conditions of collaboration. Such 
agreements must, for example, specify the “[a]vailability of the 
collaborating physician . . . for consultation or referral, or both.” LA. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 37:913(9)(a) (2012). But they need not include any 
particular form, frequency, or quantity of that availability. The law 
constrains the nature of collaboration insofar as agreements must be 
formalized and tethered to individual licensed physicians, but the law 
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Similarly, by restricting the permissible physical distance between 
APRNs and supervising doctors, the State of Florida restricts the 
ability of providers to develop new models of networked or telemedi-
cine-facilitated collaboration.171 Diverse public and private 
experiments with the roles that APRNs might play in primary care 
delivery suggest quality of care benefits associated with the use of 
APRNs as primary care providers.172 They suggest, in turn, not just 
particular roles that APRNs might fill in delivering safe, high-quality 
primary care services but a further policy question of whether this 
type of institutional innovation ought to be constrained by any 
particular supervision regulations.  
Evidence that the collaborative practice agreements were neces-
sary to protect patients (or even helpful in that regard) appeared to 
be non-existent. No record of patient harms associated with expired or 
defective collaborative practice agreements in Louisiana was in 
evidence.173 More telling was a sort of natural experiment across the 
 
otherwise affords providers a substantial degree of freedom with regard 
to their implementation of collaboration. The concern is that relatively 
bare bones requirements – imposed on one of the contracting parties but 
not the other – might prompt correspondingly pure cases of physician 
rent-seeking, at least in certain markets. More detailed requirements 
may, if well designed, assure that at least some value is associated with 
the collaborative agreement, but they do so by constraining the ability 
of providers to develop new models of collaboration (and, not 
incidentally, increasing the cost of compliance). See, e.g., IOM FUTURE 
OF NURSING REPORT, supra note 1, at 157-61 tbl. 3-A1 (providing an 
overview of some of the variation in requirements across the states). 
171. FLA. STAT. § 458.348(4)(c) (2013); see also MO. CODE REGS. ANN. tit. 
20, § 2150-5.100(2)(A)-(B) (2010) (requiring that a collaborating 
physician “not be so geographically distanced . . . as to create an 
impediment to effective collaboration” and that “an APRN who 
provides health care services that include the diagnosis and initiation of 
treatment for acutely or chronically ill or injured persons” not be more 
than fifty miles by road in federally-designated health professional 
shortage areas and not more than thirty miles by road otherwise). 
Institutional providers ranging across state lines are doubly restricted, 
as supervision may not take place across state lines, unless a supervising 
physicians holds multiple licenses. See Gilman, supra note 101, at 89 
(regarding competitive issues raised by physician licensure and 
telemedicine). 
172. See, e.g., IOM FUTURE OF NURSING REPORT, supra note 1, at 92-94 
(regarding APRN primary care initiatives at the Department of 
Veterans Affairs, Geisinger Health System, and Kaiser Permanente).  
173. One might wonder about the number of unsupervised cases (or those 
outside collaboration) available to create such a record. Critically, we do 
have access to the interstate record. In addition, we might wonder what 
a fine-grained investigation of Louisiana practice itself might reveal 
about the operation of collaborative practice agreements on the ground. 
The IOM Report observes that Louisiana law imposes no requirements 
for on-site supervision of APRNs, the frequency or extent to which 
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United States. As the IOM observed, APRNs had long provided 
diverse primary care services and had done so, in many jurisdictions, 
without anything analogous to Louisiana’s “collaborative practice” 
requirement. Yet “the contention that APRNs are less able than 
physicians to deliver care that is safe, effective, and efficient is not 
supported by the decades of research that has examined this ques-
tion.”174 To the contrary, a large body of empirical research strongly 
suggests that APRNs are safe and effective providers of diverse 
primary care services.175 Note, further, that one of the defining criteria 
for independent practice – and an ongoing source of contention – is 
independent prescribing of legend drugs.176 Studies that examine 
APRN prescribing suggest comparable outcomes for APRN- and MD-
provided care.177 We are not aware of countervailing empirical 
 
physicians must review the charts of APRN patients, or the maximum 
number of APRNs with whom a physician may have collaborative 
arrangements. IOM FUTURE OF NURSING REPORT, supra note 1, at 158 
tbl. 3-A1. Given that leeway, actual supervision or collaboration under 
such agreements may vary greatly. 
174. IOM FUTURE OF NURSING REPORT, supra note 1, at 111.  
175. See Robin P. Newhouse et al., Advanced Practice Nurse Outcomes 
1990-2008: A Systematic Review, 29 NURSING ECON. 1, 18 (2011) 
(“APRNs provide effective and high-quality patient care.”); Eileen M. 
Sullivan-Marx et al., Long-term Outcomes of Advanced Practice 
Nursing, in NURSE PRACTITIONERS: EVOLUTION AND FUTURE OF 
ADVANCED PRACTICE 93 (2010); Frances Hughes et al., Research in 
Support of Nurse Practitioners, in NURSE PRACTITIONERS: THE 
EVOLUTION AND FUTURE OF ADVANCED PRACTICE 65, 68 (Eileen M. 
Sullivan-Marx et al. eds., 2010); Miranda Laurant et al., Substitution of 
Doctors by Nurses in Primary Care, The COCHRANE LIBRARY, July 15, 
2004, at 2; Sue Horrocks et al., Systematic Review of Whether Nurse 
Practitioners Working in Primary Care Can Provide Equivalent Care to 
Doctors, 324 BRIT. MED. J. 819, 822 (2002); Mary O. Mundinger et al., 
Primary Care Outcomes in Patients Treated by Nurse Practitioners or 
Physicians: A Randomized Trial, 283 JAMA 59 (2000); Pamela Venning 
et al., Randomised Controlled Trial Comparing Cost Effectiveness of 
General Practitioners and Nurse Practitioners in Primary Care, 320 
BRIT. MED. J. 1048, 1050 (2000) (“There was no significant difference in 
patterns of prescribing or health status outcome. . . .”); Sharon Brown 
and Deanna Grimes, A Meta-Analysis of Nurse Practitioners and Nurse 
Midwives in Primary Care, 44 NURSING RESEARCH 332 (1995). 
176. See Louisiana FTC Letter, supra note 13, at 3, 5; West Virginia 
Testimony, supra note 48, at 3-6; cf. IOM FUTURE OF NURSING REPORT, 
supra note 1, at 110-11 (regarding physician and AMA opposition). 
177. See, e.g., Mundinger et al. supra note 175, at 61 (finding no significant 
difference in patients’ health status or physiologic test results in a study 
comparing outcomes for 1316 ambulatory care patients randomly 
assigned to APRN and MD primary care providers where APRNs had 
“same authority to prescribe, consult, refer, and admit patients”); 
Elizabeth R. Lenz et al., Primary Care Outcomes in Patients Treated 
by Nurse Practitioners or Physicians: Two-year Follow-up, 61 MED. 
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evidence suggesting special patient harms or risks associated with 
APRN prescribing.178  
No other countervailing policy benefits appeared to be at issue, 
and no substantial implementation costs were associated with the bill. 
Yet the bill did not escape committee. Given the impact of provider 
shortages across much of Louisiana, we prefer to find that result 
baffling. Of course, none of this is to suggest that APRNs should not 
consult, collaborate with, or refer patients to physicians. None of this 
suggests that a consumer might not prefer an MD practitioner as a 
primary care service provider or the locus of a “medical home.”179 
None of this suggests that APRNs and primary care physicians ought 
to share a single, uniform scope of practice. The question, rather, is 
whether there are adequate grounds – or even any substantial grounds 
– on which to circumscribe APRN scope of practice in the way that 
the legislature did and thus to impose substantial health care access 
costs on the public.  
 
CARE RESEARCH REV. 332 (2004) (stating that the two-year follow-up 
data for Mundinger et al.’s study was consistent with the preliminary 
results); Ann B. Hamric et al., Outcomes Associated with Advanced 
Nursing Practice Prescriptive Authority, 10 J. AM. ACAD. NURSE PRAC. 
113, 117 (1998) (evaluating safety and effectiveness in a study of thirty-
three APRNs in twenty-five primary care sites); Venning et al., supra 
note 175 (“There was no significant difference in patterns of prescribing 
or health status outcome . . . .”). 
178. The history of prescribing restrictions may be at least as puzzling. These 
began narrowly with the Harrison Anti-Narcotic Act in 1914. More 
general prescribing requirements emerged between rulemaking 
implementing the 1938 enactment of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act 
(if on dubious statutory authority) and 1953 amendments to the FDCA. 
This history suggests legitimate health and safety concerns about, e.g., 
patent medicines. Equally, however, it suggests mixed economic motives 
on the part of regulatory advocates and, for some time, a muddy 
empirical basis for claims about medicine’s expertise or consumer health 
benefits associated with prescribing restrictions. Compare Peter Temin, 
The Origin of Compulsory Drug Prescription, 22 J. L. AND ECON. 91 
(1979), with Harry M. Marks, Revisiting “The Origins of Compulsory 
Drug Prescriptions,” 85 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 109, 109-10 (1995). 
179. For example, a recent report recommends that U.S. patients transition 
(more fully) to a medical home model of care, with a primary care 
physician leading each “patient-centered” team. AM. ACAD. OF FAM. 
PHYSICIANS, PRIMARY CARE FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 1 (2012), available 
at http://www.aafp.org/online/etc/medialib/aafp_org/documents/ 
membership/nps/primary-care-21st-century/whitepaper.Par.0001.File. 
dat/AAFP-PCMHWhitePaper.pdf. That model may be advantageous in 
many regards. Still, that does not establish a particular supervision 
scheme as optimal or efficient, much less – given shortages 
acknowledged by the report itself – identify alternative models of care as 
so universally deficient or dangerous that the law should not permit 
them.  
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2. Retail Clinic Regulations 
Reification of supervisory arrangements also has been a point of 
concern with the regulation of “retail” or “limited service” clinics 
(RCs). RCs – which tend to be staffed by APRNs – are health care 
clinics located in retail settings (such as pharmacies and supermar-
kets) that offer consumers a convenient way to obtain basic medical 
care at transparent and competitive prices.180 RCs tend to offer a 
limited subset of the primary care services available at primary care 
centers, ambulatory care clinics, and urgent care centers.181 Evidence 
indicates that RC care, although limited, tends to be high quality.182  
States have, in various ways, made room for RCs in their clinic or 
facilities regulations, and FTC staff members have not found competi-
tion concerns where proposed RC rules “mirror basic consumer 
protection standards that are imposed on competing providers of basic 
health care services.”183 Heightened restrictions on care delivered 
under a particular business model have, however, raised concerns both 
as they may discriminate against an innovative model of delivery and 
as they may work as de facto scope of practice restrictions on those 
professionals employed under the model. For example, an Illinois bill 
stipulated that RCs appoint a physician director and that “[a] 
physician may be a medical director of no more than 2 facilities”184 – 
potentially a costly and unnecessary limitation on the organization 
and operation of retail clinics. Moreover, FTC staff were concerned 
 
180. See 2007 Massachusetts FTC Letter, supra note 47, at 2; see generally, 
William M. Sage, Might the Fact that 90% of Americans Live within 15 
Miles of a Wal-Mart Help Achieve Universal Health Care?, 55 U. KAN. 
L. REV. 1233, 1238 (2008) (describing the size and scope of RCs). 
181. See, e.g., Ateev Mehrotra et al., Comparing Costs and Quality of Care 
at Retail Clinics with That of Other Medical Settings for 3 Common 
Illnesses, 151 ANNALS OF INTERNAL MED. 321, 326 (2009) (providing an 
analysis of fourteen quality metrics for commonly treated ailments: otitis 
media [ear infection], streptococcal pharyngitis [strep], and urinary tract 
infections). Cf. Ateev Mehrotra & Judith R. Lave, Visits to Retail 
Clinics Grew Fourfold From 2007 To 2009, Although Their Share of 
Overall Outpatient Visits Remains Low, 31 HEALTH AFFS. 2123, 2123-24 
(2012) (noting decline in percentage of acute care visits and increase in 
preventive care since 2009 study). 
182. See Mehrotra et al., supra note 181, at 325-26 (explaining that evidence 
shows that the quality of care in LSCs is “similar to that provided in 
physician offices and urgent care centers and slightly superior to that of 
emergency departments”). 
183. Kentucky FTC Letter to Brown, supra note 48, at 2. For example, in 
comments regarding wide-ranging LSC regulations proposed by the 
Massachusetts Department of Public Health, FTC staff comments 
addressed only proposed advertising restrictions. See generally 2007 
Massachusetts FTC Letter, supra note 48, at 1.  
184. Illinois FTC Letter, supra note 47, at 6. 
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that the two-clinic limit could be read to impose special supervisory 
requirements on licensed APRNs working in retail settings.185 
The cost of undue clinic restrictions might be substantial. A 2009 
study conducted for the Commonwealth of Massachusetts considers, 
among other things, the savings potentially associated with increased 
use of retail clinics, contingent on regulatory reform.186 The reported 
upper bound savings for Massachusetts, between 2010 and 2020, is $6 
billion (0.9% of total spending).187  
Elsewhere, proposals to restrict the scope of practice in RCs 
raised more particular concerns. For example, under rules proposed in 
Kentucky, an APRN (indeed even a physician) practicing at an RC 
could provide a physical examination for sports or camp but not for 
school.188 The same practitioner could provide a school or camp 
physical at a comparable clinic, however.189 The proposed rule also 
would have prohibited – only at RCs – the vaccination of any patient 
under the age of 16 and, generally, the treatment of any person with 
any chronic or recurring ailment, including indications that the same 
professionals could treat in similar limited care settings, such as 
urgent care clinics.190  
One might imagine that special practice limitations are associated 
with small, stand-alone clinics with limited physical resources. RC 
regulations could address such limitations. Sometimes, however, that 
consumer safety rationale seems wholly unavailable. As noted, RC 
quality ratings are high191 – perhaps unsurprising, as the range of LSC 
services is considerably narrower than the scope of APRN practice.192 
 
185. Id. at 6. 
186. CHRISTINE E. EIBNER ET AL., RAND HEALTH REPORT SUBMITTED TO THE 
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS, DIV. HEALTH CARE FIN. & POL’Y, 
CONTROLLING HEALTH CARE SPENDING IN MASSACHUSETTS: AN ANALYSIS 
OF OPTIONS 83-90 (2009) (considering both relaxed supervision 
requirements for APRNs/NPs and changes in the laws governing the 
“corporate practice of medicine”). 
187. Id. at 87 (explaining that the lower bound projection is zero based on 
the assumption that retail clinics “do not takeoff as a business strategy 
and have no noticeable effect on health spending”). 
188. Kentucky FTC Letter to Brown, supra note 47, at 6. 
189. Id. at 6. 
190. 902 Ky. Admin. Reg. 20:400 (Dec. 15, 2009) (“A clinic shall not: (a) 
Treat a person with a recurring or chronic illness; or (b) Refill a 
prescription for a patient who requires continuity of care.”). 
191. See Mehrotra et al., supra note 181, at 325-26. 
192. See Kentucky FTC Letter to Brown, supra note 47, at 6-7; see also 
Mehrotra & Lave, supra note 181, at 3-5, ex. 5 (noting that despite 
some changes in case mix, the vast majority of retail clinic visits remain 
for basic preventive care – 40.8% for vaccinations alone – and a very 
limited set are primary acute care visits); Mehrotra et al., supra note 
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Hence, the competition question is not whether RCs and the profes-
sionals staffing them should be subject to any regulation. Rather, the 
question is whether particular restrictions imposed only on RCs are 
justified sufficiently to restrict the ability of price-sensitive patients to 
seek very basic care there – perhaps during off-work hours when, for 
some, an over-taxed and inefficient emergency room represents the 
only practicable alternative.193  
3. Nurse Anesthetist Regulations 
Some twenty-five years after the FTC staff addressed the District 
of Columbia’s regulation of nurse anesthetists, they returned to the 
topic, discussing limits on CRNA pain treatment proposed in several 
states.194 Recent CRNA-related comments have addressed more varied 
restrictions than the APRN supervision requirements discussed above. 
For example, in January 2014, FTC staff issued comments on a 
Massachusetts bill that proposed to lift requirements that CRNAs 
providing basic perioperative care – anesthesia and pain medicine 
before and after surgery – order tests and therapeutics, and prescribe 
medication, only under a formal supervisory agreement with a 
physician.195 In 2012, the FTC staff issued comments on a Missouri 
bill, which stipulated that only physicians could treat pain through 
use of injections around the spine or spinal cord guided by imaging 
technology.196 That would limit CRNA scope of practice by de facto 
prohibition of those interventional pain treatments where imaging 
guidance was established or recommended practice. FTC staff also 
addressed proposed rules in Alabama that would have prevented all 
interventional treatment of chronic pain by CRNAs, even treatments 
 
181, at 326 (stating that generally retail clinics provide high quality care 
and that there is no difference between physician and NP-provided 
care).  
193. Mehrotra & Lave, supra note 181, at 3 (“Approximately one quarter 
(28.9 percent) of weekday visits occurred during hours when physician 
offices are typically closed. Adding weekend visits to that proportion, we 
found that 44.4 percent of the retail clinic visits in our data occurred 
when physician offices are likely to be closed.”) Mehrotra and Lave also 
observed an increased proportion of LSC visits by patients aged 65 or 
older. Id. See also EIBNER ET AL., supra note 186, at 85 (“Retail clinics 
could produce savings in the health care system by reducing ED 
utilization for routine conditions.”). 
194. See Missouri CRNA Letter, supra note 50; Tennessee FTC Letter to 
Odom, supra note 50; Alabama FTC Letter, supra note 50; 2014 
Massachusetts FTC Letter, supra note 48. 
195. 2007 Massachusetts FTC Letter, supra note 47, at 3. 
196. See Missouri CRNA Letter, supra note 50 (regarding H.B 1399, 96th 
Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess., (Mo. 2012)). 
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supervised by physicians197 and a Tennessee bill imposing stringent 
supervision requirements on CRNA practice but only in certain types 
of facilities and excepting certain procedures.198  
Here, too, an underlying concern has to do with workforce supply 
issues, with undersupply tied to inadequate access to basic health care 
services. Staff noted, for example, a separate IOM study that exam-
ines pain as a public health problem.199 There, the IOM observes 
widespread under-treatment of pain – with pain itself estimated to 
affect “tens of millions of Americans and contribute[ ] substantially to 
morbidity, mortality, disability, demands on the health care system, 
and significant economic burdens for the nation.”200 The IOM also 
observed significant access problems, especially, but not only, for 
vulnerable populations.201 To put that assessment of under-treatment 
and provider shortage in context, we consider the IOM’s cost esti-
mates: 
A regression analysis . . . revealed that the annual cost of pain 
in the United States is $560-635 billion in 2010 constant dollars 
. . . . This estimate combines the incremental cost of health care 
($261-300 billion) and the cost of lost productivity ($11.6-12.7 
billion) attributable to pain. The $560-635 billion range is a 
conservative estimate because it excludes the costs of pain af-
fecting institutionalized individuals (including nursing home 
residents and corrections inmates), military personnel, children 
under age 18, and personal caregivers (such as spouses who miss 
 
197. Alabama FTC Letter, supra note 50, at 1 (regarding Alabama State 
Board of Medical Examiners’ Proposed Rule 540-X-15 on Interventional 
Pain Management). 
198. See Tennessee FTC Letter to Odom, supra note 50, at 1, 4 (regarding 
the bill’s requirement of direct on-site physician supervision of 
interventional pain management services delivered in certain federal 
health care facilities and in smaller clinics and offices not subject to 
TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-11-204’s licensure requirements). The Tennessee 
bill applied to a wide range of interventional pain treatments but 
expressly excepted epidurals for surgical anesthesia or labor analgesia. 
199. See generally INST. OF MED., RELIEVING PAIN IN AMERICA: A BLUEPRINT 
FOR TRANSFORMING PREVENTION, CARE, EDUCATION, AND RESEARCH 55 
(2011) [hereinafter IOM PAIN REPORT], available at 
http://www.nap.edu/openbook.php?record_id=13172. 
200. Id.  
201. See id. at 64-84, 119-20, 170-80 (regarding disparate impact and access 
issues and undersupply of appropriately trained practitioners). Cf. 
HRSA PHYSICIAN WORKFORCE REPORT, supra note 150, at 70-74 
(projecting increased shortages of specialists, including anesthesiologists, 
as well as primary care physicians, especially if public expectations and 
ability to pay for care increase). There are, of course, questions about 
how best to assess and project shortages. Id. at 62-74. 
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work while caring for people with pain), as well as the lost 
productivity of workers younger than 24 and older than 65.202 
In their Missouri comments, FTC staff noted state findings that 
both hospitals and full-time physicians were “relatively scarce in 
Missouri’s rural areas”203 and that rural facilities often lack special-
ists.204 Staff also noted testimony that CRNAs were the only licensed 
providers of anesthesia services in thirty-one Missouri counties.205 
Similarly, FTC staff had addressed interventional pain treatment 
restrictions proposed in Tennessee, where testimony indicated that 
CRNAs were the only licensed providers of anesthesia services in 
thirty-nine counties.206 Nationally, CRNA practices disproportionately 
serve rural patients.207 
Evidence of shortages – and attendant access issues – thus dove-
tailed with evidence about the potential competitive impact of the 
legislation. The proposed restrictions appeared to encompass services 
already provided by CRNAs, including services for which CRNAs 
were nationally certified.208 Some stakeholders had expressed concern 
 
202. IOM PAIN REPORT, supra note 199, at 91-92 (describing its own 
estimate and discussing measurement issues at Appendix C of the 
Report and also describing a 2010 NIH study estimating “$100 billion as 
the total U.S. cost of pain, including health care expenses, lost income, 
and lost productivity”). 
203. Missouri CRNA Letter, supra note 50, at 3 (citing MO. DEPT. OF 
HEALTH AND SENIOR SERVS., MISSOURI RURAL HEALTH BIENNIAL REPORT 
2010-2011, at 3 (2011), available at 
http://health.mo.gov/living/families/ruralhealth/pdf/biennial2011.pdf). 
204. Id. 
205. Id. (citing SB682 Hearing Before the Mo. Subcomm. on Health, Mental 
Health, Seniors and Families, 2012 Leg., 96th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. 
Sess. (Mo. 2012) (statement of Vicki Coopmans, Mo. Ass’n Nurse 
Anesthetists)). 
206. Tennessee FTC Letter to Odom, supra note 50, at 3 n. 33. 
207. See Brian Dulisse & Jerry Cromwell, No Harm Found When Nurse 
Anesthetists Work Without Supervision by Physicians, 29 HEALTH AFFS. 
1469, 1469 (2010) (“CRNAs provide thirty million anesthetics annually 
in the United States and represent two-thirds of anesthetists in rural 
hospitals.”); Missouri CRNA Letter, supra note 50, at 7 n. 22 (quoting 
J.P. Abenstein & Mark A Warner, Anesthesia Providers, Patient 
Outcomes, and Costs, 82 ANESTHESIA & ANALGESIA 1273, 1279 (1996)) 
(“Nurse anesthetist-only practices found predominantly in smaller, rural 
hospitals.”). 
208. Missouri CRNA Letter, supra note 50, at 6 n. 13 (“National certification 
of CRNAs is administered by the National Board on Certification and 
Recertification of Nurse Anaesthetists (NBCRNA), which determines 
eligibility requirements for the certification exam, and formulates and 
administers the National Certification Exam for CRNAs.”); IOM 
FUTURE OF NURSING REPORT, supra note 1, at 41 (stating that CRNAs 
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that the bill’s restriction of injections “around the spine or spinal 
cord” could apply to a wide range of common procedures, including 
epidural injections administered to manage pain during labor and 
delivery or in post-surgical pain management.209 Two Missouri 
hospitals testified to their dependence on CRNAs to provide certain 
pain management treatments associated with labor and delivery and 
to aid with imaging technology for certain surgical procedures.210 
Missouri CRNAs testified that ultrasound technology, in particular, 
was integral to their treatment of both acute and chronic pain.211 
 
“[a]dminister anesthesia and provide related care before and after 
surgical, therapeutic, diagnostic, and obstetrical procedures, as well as 
pain management”). 
209. See Missouri CRNA Letter, supra note 50, at 6 (quoting SB682 Hearing 
Before the Missouri Subcomm. on Health, Mental Health, Seniors and 
Families, 2012 Leg., 96th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2012) 
(statement of Matt Wenzel, Hendrick Med. Ctr.) [hereinafter Wenzel 
Testimony] (“[Bill’s definitions are] so broad in scope that we believe it 
will be applied to the OB and surgical procedures for which we use 
CRNA anesthesia.”)); Hearing on H.B. 1399 Before Mo. House Comm. 
on Licensure and Professional Regulation, 2012 Leg., 96th Gen. 
Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2012) (statement of Gary Jordan) 
[hereinafter Jordan Testimony]; Missouri CRNA Letter, supra note 50, 
at 6-7 (quoting SB682 Hearing Before the Mo. Subcomm. on Health, 
Mental Health, Seniors and Families, 2012 Leg., 96th Gen. Assemb., 2d 
Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2012) (statement of Vicki Coopmans, Mo. Ass’n Nurse 
Anesthetists) (expressing “concerns about the Bill’s impact on the 
ability of CRNAs ability of CRNAs [sic] ‘to perform many procedures to 
treat or prevent acute pain, such as epidurals for women in labor or 
certain nerve blocks after surgery’”); Hearing on Review of West 
Virginia Laws Governing the Scope of Practice for Advanced Practice 
Registered Nurses and Consideration of Possible Revisions to Remove 
Practice Restrictions Before Subcomm. A of the Joint Comm. on 
Health, W. Va. Legislature (W. Va. 2008) (statement of FTC). 
210. Wenzel Testimony, supra note 209; Jordan Testimony, supra note 209. 
211. See Missouri CRNA Letter, supra note 50, at 7 (quoting Hearing on 
H.B. 1399 Before Mo. House Comm. on Licensure and Professional 
Regulation, 2012 Leg., 96th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2012) 
(statement of Joe Dietrick, CRNA)) (“Ultrasound, particularly, is a 
commonly used and extremely safe form of imaging used not just by 
physicians, but also by CRNAs, and even Registered Nurses. This device 
can help us with difficult epidural or spinal placement for surgery or 
obstetrical patients. Although clearly within our Scope of Practice, our 
plans for acute post-operative pain techniques using ultrasound guidance 
for patients of our Orthopedic Surgeon may be impeded. It is also used 
for placement of central venous catheters.”). See also id. at 6-7 (quoting 
SB682 Hearing Before the Mo. Subcomm. on Health, Mental Health, 
Seniors and Families, 2012 Leg., 96th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Mo. 
2012) (statement of Vicki Coopmans, Mo. Ass’n Nurse Anesthetists)) 
(noting that the language of the bill could be interpreted to prevent 
CRNAs from providing chronic and acute pain treatments). 
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Under those conditions, the bill at issue – although not the version 
eventually passed into law – would have prohibited CRNAs from 
treating both acute and chronic pain patients with the aid of any 
established imaging technology.212  
As with the more general primary care practices of APRNs ad-
dressed in Louisiana and elsewhere, there did not appear to be any 
record of patient harms driving the proposed restrictions.213 That is 
not to suggest that baseline risks evaporate in the presence of 
CRNAs.214 One could raise any number of health and safety concerns 
about pain management. Recent events involving injectable pain 
medicines have raised terrible questions about the integrity of the 
available pharmacopeia,215 and there have been ongoing national 
concerns about diversion and misuse of pain medicines.216 The litera-
 
212. As introduced, Missouri HB 1399 covered “the injection of therapeutic 
substances around the spine or spinal cord for the treatment of acute 
and chronic pain syndromes” when guided by “fluoroscopic, 
computerized axial tomography (CAT) scan, magnetic resonance 
imaging (MRI), or ultrasound.” The law ultimately enacted did not 
include any express restriction on CRNA treatment of acute pain, but 
rather expressly limited its application to treatment “outside of a 
surgical, obstetrical, or post-operative course of care.” H.B. 1399, 96th 
Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2012). 
213. In addition to a dearth of literature documenting pertinent harms or 
risks, neither systematic nor ad hoc reports of patient harms in the state 
was evident in the legislative record. FTC staff expressly made a similar 
point in comments regarding proposed Alabama pain management rules. 
Alabama FTC Letter, supra note 50, at 6 n. 31. The American Society 
of Anesthesiologists comments submitted to the Alabama legislature 
identify risks generally associated with interventional pain management 
and include an abstract observation that interventions administered in 
the upper spine involve more risks, such as “allergic reactions, infections, 
bleeding, nerve damage, spinal cord injuries (e.g., paraplegia or 
quadriplegia), brain stem infarctions, and even death.” Am. Soc’y of 
Anesthesiologists Letter, supra note 135 (citing no evidence of harms 
caused by prior Alabama regulations).  
214. See, e.g., Am. Soc’y of Anesthesiologists Letter, supra note 135 
(identifying general background risks and alleging, although not 
documenting, special risks associated with CRNA treatment). 
215. See generally Multistate Fungal Meningitis Outbreak Investigation, 
CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION (Oct. 23, 2013), 
http://www.cdc.gov/HAI/outbreaks/meningitis.html (providing links to 
information regarding multistate outbreak of fungal meningitis and 
other infections among patients who received contaminated steroid 
injections).  
216. See, e.g., Prescription Drug Diversion: Combating the Scourge: Hearing 
before the House Subcomm. On Commerce, Manufacturing and Trade of 
the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 112th Cong. 78-89 (2012) 
(statement of Joseph T. Rannazzisi, Deputy Assistant Adm’r, Drug 
Enforcement Admin., U.S. Dep’t Justice); Nora D. Volkow et al., 
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ture identifies various medical risks associated with certain pain 
management procedures217 and raises concerns about the costs and 
benefits of interventional pain management and imaging technology in 
varying medical contexts.218 Moreover, although numerous studies 
suggest that CRNAs are safe practitioners of the procedures that they 
tend to provide,219 data regarding certain pain treatments appears 
 
Research Letter: Characteristics of Opioid Prescriptions in 2009, 305 
JAMA 1299, 1300 (2011) (noting increases in opioid prescriptions and 
associated increases in abuse and overdoses as cause of concern and area 
for further research); Andrea M. Trescot et al., Opioids in the 
Management of Chronic Non-Cancer Pain: An Update of American 
Society of the Interventional Pain Physicians’ (ASIPP) Guidelines, 11 
PAIN PHYSICIAN S5, S20-5 (2008). Looking at distinct (or partly distinct) 
populations, one might be simultaneously concerned about both abuse 
and under-treatment. “Ironically, while many people with pain have 
difficulty obtaining opioid medications, nonmedical users appear to 
obtain them far too easily . . . so much so that the diversion of opioid 
analgesics has become a national public health problem.” IOM PAIN 
REPORT, supra note 199, at 146. 
217. See, e.g., ROBIN HASHIMOTO ET AL., WASH. STATE HEALTH CARE AUTH., 
SPINAL INJECTIONS: HEALTH TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT (2011), available 
at http://www.hca.wa.gov/hta/documents/updated_final_report_ 
spinal_injections_0310-1.pdf (reviewing evidence of efficacy, safety, and 
cost-effectiveness for diverse spinal injections); see also James P. 
Rathmell et al., Injury and Liability Associated with Cervical 
Procedures for Chronic Pain, 114 ANESTHESIOLOGY 918, 918 (2011) 
(reporting that “injuries related to cervical interventional pain 
treatment were often severe and related to direct needle trauma to the 
spinal cord”); Dermot R. Fitzgibbon et al., Chronic Pain Management, 
100 ANESTHESIOLOGY 98, 98 (2004) (“[F]requency and payments of 
claims associated with chronic pain management by anesthesiologists 
increased in the 1990s. Brain damage and death were associated with 
epidural steroid injection only when opioids or local anesthetics were 
included.”). 
218. See HASHIMOTO ET AL., supra note 217. Regarding effectiveness in 
different clinical contexts, compare Stephen Choi & Richard Brull, Is 
Ultrasound Guidance Advantageous for Interventional Pain 
Management? A Review of Acute Pain Outcomes, 113 ANESTHESIA & 
ANALGESIA 596, 596 (2011) (concluding that “at present, there is 
insufficient evidence in the contemporary literature to define the effect 
of US [ultrasound] guidance on acute pain and related outcomes 
compared with traditional nerve localization techniques for 
interventional acute pain management”), with John Antonakakis et al., 
Ultrasound Guided Regional Anesthesia for Peripheral Nerve Blocks: An 
Evidence-based Outcomes Review, 29 ANESTHESIOLOGY CLINICS 179 
(2011) (observing some advantages for block-related outcome variables). 
219. See, e.g., Dulisse & Cromwell, supra note 207, at 1474 (observing 
declining mortality and adverse outcomes with increased CRNA 
services); Michael Pine et al., Surgical Mortality and Type of Anesthesia 
Provider, 71 AANA J. 109, 111 (2003) (observing low mortality rates 
and no significant differences in risk-adjusted mortality rates by type of 
anesthesia provider or type of anesthesia practice). Cf. A.F. Smith et al., 
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lacking, and the empirical literature regarding safety and effective-
ness, across the full range of pain indications and available 
treatments, cannot be considered comprehensive.220 Some of these 
issues could comprise countervailing patient safety concerns, poten-
tially offsetting certain competitive costs or figuring in a cost-benefit 
analysis of pain treatment regulations. Any of them might raise 
complex considerations for nursing or medical education, training, and 
practice.221 Any or all might prompt a measure of regulatory caution.  
FTC staff comments did not, however, repudiate antecedent con-
cerns that policymakers might have about interventional pain 
treatment, the capabilities of those who offer various pain treatment 
services, or the contexts in which such services are provided.222 
Neither did the staff seek to preempt the state’s policy process or 
priorities.223 Against the backdrop of an extremely broad and evolving 
field of pain management science, practice, and training,224 there 
remained nonetheless the question whether the restrictions at issue 
addressed health and safety concerns or offered any other consumer 
benefits. Under a competition analysis, such benefits, if established, 
would need to offset the competitive costs or consumer harm associat-
 
Comparative Effectiveness and Safety of Physician and Nurse 
Anaesthetists: A Narrative Systematic Review, 93 BRIT. J. 
ANAESTHESIA 540, 544 (2004) (examining U.S. and foreign studies 
finding “no recent, high-level evidence that there are significant 
differences in safety between different anaesthesia providers”); Paul F. 
Hogan et al., Cost Effectiveness Analysis of Anesthesia Providers, 28 
NURSING ECON. 159, 161 (2010) (“[T]here are no studies that show a 
significant difference between CRNAs and anesthesiologists in patient 
outcomes.”). 
220. Cf. Smith et al., supra note 219, at 541 (finding that the studies were   
“. . . too dissimilar to [admit] formal meta-analysis”). 
221. See generally IOM PAIN REPORT, supra note 199, at 170-216 (discussing 
“Education Challenges”). 
222. See, e.g., Missouri CRNA Letter, supra note 50, at 3-4 (recognizing 
health and safety concerns and asking that legislators take a balanced 
regulatory approach, considering competitive costs, when addressing 
them). 
223. Id. 
224. IOM PAIN REPORT, supra note 199, at 24-31, 113-36 (discussing the 
diversity of pain indications). See, e.g., Pain Management, AM. SOC’Y 
ANESTHESIOLOGISTS, 
http://www.lifelinetomodernmedicine.com/Anesthesia-Topics/Pain-
Management.aspx (last visited Jan. 4, 2014); Q&A: Chronic Pain, Am. 
Soc’y Anesthesiologists, 
http://www.lifelinetomodernmedicine.com/Anesthesia-Topics/QA-
Chronic-Pain.aspx (last visited Jan. 4, 2014); Q&A: Acute Postoperative 
Pain Medicine, AM. SOC’Y ANESTHESIOLOGISTS, 
http://www.lifelinetomodernmedicine.com/Anesthesia-Topics/QA-
Acute-Postoperative-Pain-Medicine.aspx (last visited Jan. 4, 2014). 
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ed with the restrictions at issue. Yet there is no reason to think that 
significant numbers of CRNAs provide (or attempt to provide) the 
full range of pain treatments offered by board certified pain special-
ists.225  
We suggest that a rule’s costs and benefits chiefly have to do with 
the changes in behavior that it prompts, or is likely to prompt, rather 
than its theoretical reach.226 Against both very general concerns about 
pain treatment and incomplete literature, we note considerable 
evidence suggesting that CRNAs are safe providers of those anesthesia 
and pain treatments that they commonly offer.227 And there does not 
appear to be countervailing evidence that CRNAs generally, or in 
particular chronic care contexts, are unsafe. In their Missouri com-
ments, staff also noted that the Department of Health and Human 
Services (HHS) had several times reviewed the available literature on 
the integrity of anesthesia services in publishing rules regarding the 
provision of hospital anesthesia services under the Medicare and 
Medicaid programs. In 2001, the Centers for Medicaid and Medicare 
Services (CMS) concluded that anesthesia services generally were safe 
and, in particular, that there was “no need for Federal intervention in 
State professional practice laws governing CRNA practice” and “no 
reason to require a Federal rule in these conditions of participation 
mandating that physicians supervise the practice of [state-licensed 
CRNAs].”228 By 2012, CMS had clarified its reimbursement policy 
expressly to include coverage for those chronic pain management 
services provided by CRNAs that are within the scope of their 
 
225. Cf. Missouri CRNA Letter, supra note 50, at 6-7 (describing CRNA 
training and practice in Missouri). 
226. On that view, if CRNAs universally or overwhelmingly avoid, e.g., 
surgical interventions in the cervical spine, then expressly removing such 
treatments from their scope of practice may cost little beyond the costs 
of the rule’s adoption. At the same time, the benefits of such 
prohibitions may equal or approach zero. More important, a 
concatenation of such prohibitions should not obscure basic appraisal of 
a rule’s likely costs and benefits (as, for example, in suggesting either 
that the majority of (nominally) prohibited practices are beyond 
CRNAs’ training and experience or are relatively novel or high-risk 
procedures). 
227. See supra note 219 and accompanying text. 
228. Medicare and Medicaid Programs; Hospital Conditions of Participation: 
Anesthesia Services, 66 Fed. Reg. 4674, 4674-76 (Jan. 18, 2001) (to be 
codified at 42 C.F.R. pts. 482.52 and 485). Cf. Medicare and Medicaid 
Programs; Hospital Conditions of Participation: Anesthesia Services, 66 
Fed. Reg. 56762, 56762-63 (Nov. 13, 2001) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. 
pts. 416, 482, and 485) (repeating observations on safety literature but 
noting potential utility of independent study of question whether safety 
or quality effects are associated with state regulations permitting 
independent CRNA practice). 
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practice, as determined under state law. In doing so, CMS observed 
both that chronic pain management is “an evolving field” and that 
changes in CRNA practice and training have been ongoing.229 Eschew-
ing rigid categorical limits in that context, CMS noted that its 
decision to reimburse CRNA-administered treatment “is consistent 
with the Institute of Medicine’s recommendation that Medicare cover 
services provided by advanced practice nurses to the full extent of 
their state scope of practice.”230 
One could have raised a countervailing safety consideration. By 
limiting the provision of imagery-guided interventional pain treat-
ments to physicians, the bill effectively barred CRNAs from providing 
such services, a subset of which seemed to be an established part of 
their training and practice. The bill did not bar any physicians – 
however trained and experienced – from practicing interventional pain 
medicine.231 No board certification in pain management or anesthesia 
was required. That raised the question whether non-specialist physi-
cians and osteopaths might sometimes substitute for newly restricted 
CRNAs. We do not argue that specialist certification ought to be 
required of all pain treatment by physicians.232 Still, the question of 
who would fill the gap, considered against background risks, calls to 
mind some of the concerns raised in the IOM’s 2011 Pain Report: 
“[T]here are strong indications that pain receives insufficient attention 
in virtually all phases of medical education,”233 and in the report from 
an American Medical Association Pain Summit: “[P]hysician training 
in pain care . . . was seen as poor or ‘not leading to competency’ at 
both the undergraduate and residency levels in all suggested areas of 
pain treatment.”234 That should raise serious questions about the 
 
229. 42 C.F.R. §§ 410, 414, 415, 421, 423, 425, 486, 495; Medicare Program; 
Revisions to Payment Policies Under the Physician Fee Schedule, DME 
Face-to-Face Encounters, Elimination of the Requirement for 
Termination of Non-Random Prepayment Complex Medical Review and 
Other Revisions to Part B for CY 2013, 77 Fed. Reg. 68892, 69006 
(Nov. 16, 2012). 
230. Medicare Program; Revisions to Payment Policies, 77 Fed. Reg. at 
69,008. 
231. Missouri H.B. 1399 simply amended Missouri Section A, Chapter 334 to 
provide that services “shall only be performed by a physician licensed 
under this chapter.” H.B. 1399, 96th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Mo. 
2012). 
232. See IOM PAIN REPORT, supra note 199, at 119-20.  
233. Id. at 191 (citing Phillip M. Lippe et al., The First National Pain 
Medicine Summit—Final Summary Report, 11 PAIN MED. 1447 (2010) 
(noting report submitted by Chair of AMA Pain and Palliative Medicine 
Specialty Section Council)). 
234. Id. 
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quality of care physician substitutes might provide across various 
treatment contexts.235 
4. Results: Impact of Competition Advocacies 
The FTC has tracked the competition advocacy program and, in 
various ways, attempted to assess its effects.236 The question of how to 
measure the impact of advocacy comments is not trivial. As Cooper, 
Pautler, and Zywicki observe, “The value of competition advocacy 
should be measured by (1) the degree to which comments altered 
regulatory outcomes and (2) the value to consumers of those im-
proved outcomes. However, (1) and (2) are impossible to determine 
with any degree of certainty.”237 Certainly, there are cases where 
legislative or regulatory results are more or less in agreement with 
staff recommendations, and sometimes there are reasonably clear 
indications that staff comments were influential. For example, as 
noted above, the first set of FTC staff comments regarding proposed 
LSC regulations were submitted to the Massachusetts Department of 
Public Health.238 The final rule issued by the Department was con-
sistent with FTC staff recommendations. The Department’s 
supporting documents noted: 
The proposed regulations had included a requirement that all 
advertising for LSCs be submitted to the Department for ap-
proval prior to use. . . . The most compelling piece of testimony 
came from the Federal Trade Commission, which suggested in-
stead that the Department would be on firmer regulatory 
ground if it merely prohibits false or misleading advertising. 
 
235. FTC staff also addressed proposed Alabama rules that raised similar 
concerns, as they would have prohibited even CRNA administration of 
treatments delegated directly to them by supervising physicians: “It is 
possible that the Proposed Rule may, on balance, reduce patient safety. 
As noted, economic or geographic access problems may place some 
Alabamans at risk of inadequate care. Also, if CRNA pain management 
specialists are sometimes replaced not by board certified 
anesthesiologists, but by physicians and osteopaths who do not 
specialize in pain management, the average quality of interventional 
pain management in Alabama, or certain parts of Alabama, could be 
reduced.” Alabama FTC Letter, supra note 50, at 7. 
236. See, e.g., FTC, PERFORMANCE & ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT FISCAL YEAR 
2011, at 41 (2011), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/opp/gpra/2011parreport.pdf; FTC, PERFORMANCE 
AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT FISCAL YEAR 2010, at 40 (2011), available 
at http://www.ftc.gov/opp/gpra/2010parreport.pdf; KOVACIC, supra 
note 39, at 121-24. 
237. Cooper et al., supra note 39, at 1105. 
238. See Missouri CRNA Letter, supra note 50; Tennessee FTC Letter to 
Odom, supra note 50; Alabama FTC Letter, supra note 50. 
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Staff is heeding this advice and proposing the suggested change 
to 105 CMR 140.1001(I)(2).239 
Still, the degree to which final policies model FTC staff recommenda-
tions varies, and signals from decision makers and other stakeholders 
about the efficacy of staff comments vary, too.240 A tally of subjective 
comments about the utility or impact of a given FTC staff issuance 
can provide a useful, if rough, sense of impact, but, as a general 
proposition, “[T]here is no means to measure a comment’s marginal 
impact in the decision-making process.”241  
There is the further question of what effect to expect. With law 
enforcement, one seeks to enforce the law. When doing so, one seeks a 
favorable resolution, which may comprise a favorable settlement or a 
favorable decision in a case litigated to its conclusion. Although 
productivity measurement issues abound here, too,242 it is important 
to recognize that the lowest hanging fruit may be important: even a 
“slam dunk” may constrain conduct or transactions that are, or would 
be, harmful to competition and consumers. But the FTC does not 
initiate or conduct state legislation or rulemaking, for which stake-
holders may be diverse, and there may be little point to researching, 
drafting, and marshaling Commission approval of advocacy comments 
that pile-on (or under) a political “slam dunk,” especially since a 
“win” may have no precedential value.243 Hence, both case selection 
criteria and expectations may be different for advocacy matters than 
for law enforcement matters – and not just because of the broader 
scope of competition policy. In addition, where the FTC and its staff 
recommend that policymakers include competitive effects among what 
may be complex policy considerations, it is at least possible that the 
recommendation will be followed, on the way to approval of a policy 
 
239. Memorandum from Paul I. Dreyer, Director, Bureau of Health Care 
Safety & Quality, to Commissioner John Auerbach and Members of the 
Public Health Council, Mass. Dep’t Pub. Health (Dec. 12, 2007), 
available at http://www.mass.gov/eohhs/docs/dph/legal/phc-memo-
dec12.doc. 
240. Even a direct citation by a decision maker may be a noisy signal of 
actual influence on the decision making process as it may in some cases 
be an attempt to, e.g., “seek political cover,” rather than report on an 
actual weighing of influences. Cooper et al., supra note 39, at 1103. 
241. Id. at 1105. 
242. See generally KOVACIC, supra note 39, at 144-74. 
243. Certainly, legislative and rule making inputs and results may exert some 
influence on future decision making within and without the jurisdiction 
in question. Still, FTC staff comments cannot establish legal precedents 
in the same way that decisions of the Commission or a court can, and 
where we cannot reliably measure the incremental effects of staff 
comments, we cannot systematically track such effects across legislative 
sessions, state lines, etc. 
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that remains concerning from a competition point of view.244 Although 
the FTC and its staff track diverse responses to their competition 
comments, they have steered sensibly clear of attempts to measure 
the extent to which such comments may improve the decision making 
processes of state regulators. Still, evaluating the impact of such 
comments on a “culture of competition” among policymakers should 
in some way take a long view and remain mindful that “competition 
advocacy is a complex and difficult process, and outright victories are 
relatively rare.”245  
Stakeholders commonly report that FTC staff competition com-
ments are “useful.”246 As noted, there typically is no way to measure 
the incremental effects of staff comments on a decision making process 
that may be complex and, in some of its fundamentals, opaque. If we 
catalogue “efficacy” on a simpler measure – a sort of “happy results 
plus” basis, counting (a) whether near-term legislative or regulatory 
decisions match or partially match FTC staff recommendations plus 
(b) some extrinsic evidence that staff comments figured in the 
decision-making – then the nursing-related advocacies discussed in 
this paper have been substantially successful – split roughly evenly 
between matters where staff comments were either “successful” or 
“partially successful” and matters where they were “unsuccessful.”247 
 
244. Note that political considerations might be complex and not just policy 
considerations. As Cooper, Pautler, and Zywicki have pointed out, 
“[A]lthough advocacy provides regulators with information concerning 
the likely economic consequences of a policy choice, the FTC is not a 
constituent . . . [and] cannot provide political support in the form of 
votes or campaign contributions.” Cooper et al., supra note 39, at 1104. 
245. Timothy J. Muris, Chairman, FTC, Creating a Culture of Competition: 
The Essential Role of Competition Advocacy, Address Before the Int’l 
Competition Network Panel on Competition Advocacy and Antitrust 
Auths. (Sept. 28, 2002), available at http://www.ftc.gov/public-
statements/2002/09/creating-culture-competition-essential-role-
competition-advocacy. 
246. For example, in 2010 and 2011 surveys of stakeholders, 100% of 
respondents found advocacy comments to be “useful” to the decision 
making process. PERFORMANCE & ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT FISCAL 
YEAR 2011, supra note 236, at 41; PERFORMANCE & ACCOUNTABILITY 
REPORT FISCAL YEAR 2010, supra note 236, at 40. 
247. For example, whereas the Massachusetts and Illinois LSC comments 
were deemed “successful,” the Kentucky LSC comments were deemed 
“partially successful” as the regulator acknowledged FTC staff 
comments and, in its final regulations, addressed some (but not all) of 
the competitive concerns raised therein. By our tally of recent matters 
based on both published FTC reports and internal documents, CRNA-
related results were as follows: Alabama (successful); Tennessee 
(unsuccessful); Missouri (partially successful). A 50-50 split roughly 
matches past reports of the impact of the advocacy program more 
generally. See, e.g., Arnold C. Celnicker, The Federal Trade 
Commission’s Competition and Consumer Advocacy Program, 33 ST. 
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Notably, however, none of the seven recent comments addressing 
supervision restrictions imposed on APRNs generally has successfully 
urged lessening restrictions that many states do without and that the 
IOM has suggested are both an impediment to adequate access to 
primary care and unnecessary for patient protection.248 
Assessing the economic impact of such advocacies remains an im-
portant topic, however difficult. Indeed, assessing the economic 
impact of policy changes addressed in the advocacy comments is 
fundamental to good government and not just the selection and 
evaluation of advocacy opportunities going forward. Whatever the 
marginal contribution of FTC staff comments – at whatever cost – 
there remain basic questions about the larger economic costs and 
benefits associated with diverse licensure and scope of practice rules 
and, at the margin, with regulatory change. These comprise not just 
compliance costs but, for example, traditional questions about effects 
on wages or compensation and, ultimately, labor supply.249  
As noted above, there is some evidence suggesting that relatively 
stringent APRN practice rules are associated with fewer per capita 
practitioners.250 Analogous evidence regarding licensure strictures on 
specialized APRNs251 and allied professions252 is broadly consistent 
 
LOUIS U. L.J. 379, 391 (1989) (reporting a survey of recipients of 
advocacy comments according to which 6% were rated “totally 
effective,” 33% were rated “moderately effective,” and 11% “slightly 
effective”). 
248. That is, we have not observed positive results in the general APRN 
advocacy comments issued since the 2011 comments to Representative 
Daphne Campbell and the Florida House of Representatives: Florida, 
Texas, Kentucky, Louisiana, and West Virginia. The West Virginia 
testimony may be regarded as provisional, rather than a failure, as it 
addressed potential reform of the State’s regulations generally and was 
not necessarily tied to any particular bill. 
249. See, e.g., MILTON FRIEDMAN & SIMON KUZNETS, INCOME FROM 
INDEPENDENT PROFESSIONAL PRACTICE (1954); Stigler, supra note 90, at 
13-14 (discussing the income variable in professional licensing); Kleiner 
& Kreuger, supra note 100, at 24 (finding substantially higher wages 
associated with licensure of a profession at the state or federal, instead 
of local, level, adjusting for educational attainment, age, experience, and 
other variables, consistent with a monopoly theory of licensure); see also 
COX & FOSTER, supra note 42, at 18-20 (arguing that income is a 
significant factor in professionals’ desire for regulation via licensing); 
Kleiner, supra note 98, at 192 (“The most generally held view on the 
economics of occupational licensing is that it restricts the supply of 
labor to the occupation and thereby drives up the price of labor as well 
as of services rendered.”). 
250. See, e.g., Sekscenski et al., supra note 111, at 1266. 
251. See id. (regarding certified nurse-midwives); Eugene R. Declercq et al., 
State Regulation, Payment Policies, and Nurse-Midwife Services, 17 
HEALTH AFFS. 190 (1998) (reporting that NMW rules that were 
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with this finding. Evidence regarding, e.g., effects on wages or 
compensation is slight, however, and its implications unclear.253 
Moreover, we have less evidence by far on the question of how such 
scope of practice restrictions may affect basic measures of access to 
primary care, in turn. For example, do particular types of supervision 
requirements change the number or distribution of APRNs in under-
served areas? Do they affect out-of-pocket prices, wait times, or 
average distances travelled for basic care? In the future, we mean to 
examine the relationship between regulatory change and one direct 
measure of primary care access – that is, the number of primary care 
office visits that actually take place per population or geographic 
 
“supportive” of NMW practice were associated with increased 
distribution of NMWs and NMW services). 
252. For example, some research regarding state dentistry regulations 
suggests that increasingly stringent licensing requirements may not be 
associated with better dental health outcomes but may be associated 
with fewer dentists per capita. Kleiner & Kudrle, supra note 109, at 575-
76. But see HOLEN, supra note 109, at 21 (finding some positive 
correlation between stringency of certain dental rules and a proxy for 
quality of care – lower average malpractice insurance rates – although 
reaching no conclusions about net benefits). 
253. Several papers attempt to correlate relatively strict (or lax) APRN 
scope of practice restrictions with physician and APRN income, 
although they do not purport to study the causal effects of either 
imposing or relaxing such restrictions. See Patricia Pittman & Benjamin 
Williams, Physician Wages in States with Expanded APRN Scope of 
Practice, 2012 NURSING RESEARCH AND PRAC. 1, 1 (2012) 
(“[P]reliminary analysis revealed no evidence of differences in [physician] 
earnings across the two groups of states.”). Regarding APRN effects, 
compare Michael J. Dueker et al., The Practice Boundaries of Advanced 
Practice Nurses: an Economic and Legal Analysis, 27 J. REGULATORY 
ECON. 309, 327 (2005) (finding relaxed restrictions associated with lower 
APRN wages and higher physician assistant wages), with John Perry, 
The Rise and Impact of Nurse Practitioners and Physician Assistants 
on their Own and Cross-Occupation Incomes, 27 CONTEMP. ECON. 
POL’Y 491, 497 (2009) (noting increased APRN prescriptive authority 
associated with slight increase in NP earnings and decrease in PA and 
MD earnings). Dueker et al. conjecture that various factors that may 
contribute to lower average APRN wages in states with relatively 
relaxed scope of practice restrictions, including the increased supply of 
APRNs and APRN services observed by Sekscenski et al., supra note 
111, and Declercq et al., supra note 251. Dueker et al., supra, at 2. Note 
that average state effects may be subject to considerable averaging 
effects, especially as rent seeking may be substantially moderated in 
more competitive markets or by certain institutional providers and 
payers. Although ad hoc reports may represent outlier observations, our 
concern about access suggests attention to the question of whether 
wage, price, and other economic effects are concentrated in medically 
underserved areas and not just statewide averages.  
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area.254 Also important, ultimately, is the question of whether certain 
licensure or scope of practice policies have measurable effects on 
particular health care compliance, outcomes, or process quality 
measures, such as those regarding availability/utilization of prenatal 
care (or corresponding rates of complications), pediatric inoculation, 
compliance with diabetes management guidelines, or rates of hospital 
readmission.  
Follow-up empirical research should help to answer these ques-
tions, informing both competition analyses and health policy and 
regulation more generally. Identifying salient measures is, of course, 
critical. Also suggested by our concern with health care access – and 
by general antitrust methods – is that the scale at which we look for 
state-law-based effects may be critical, as effects on consumers and 
providers may vary considerably within any given state. 
5. Some Persistent Concerns about Competition and Nursing Regula-
tions  
The notion that patently anticompetitive restrictions on profes-
sional services – like substantial regulatory costs generally – ought to 
be adequately justified should not be dismissed off-hand because 
questions of adequacy might sometimes be contentious. Recall our 
discussion of National Society of Professional Engineers and its 
progeny.255 Whereas the AMA has argued that “scope-of-practice 
actions of state medical boards are, and should be, immune from 
successful antitrust challenge under the antitrust state action exemp-
tion doctrine, even if the board consists primarily or entirely of 
practicing physicians,”256 the Supreme Court squarely has rejected 
“the argument that because of the special characteristics of a particu-
lar industry, monopolistic arrangements will better promote trade and 
commerce than competition.”257 Second, the Fourth Circuit held, 
based on National Society of Professional Engineers, “that it is not 
the function of a group of professionals to decide that competition is 
not beneficial in their line of work” and noted that it is not “inclined 
to condone anticompetitive conduct upon an incantation of ‘good 
 
254. See, e.g., Hofer et al., supra note 152, at 72-73 (noting primary care 
visits with physicians according to certain demographic factors and 
health condition indicators); see also Huang & Finegold, supra note 152, 
at 615; Petterson et al., supra note 152, at 508. 
255. See supra Part II.A. 
256. Federal Trade Commission (FTC) State Engagement, AM. MED. ASS’N, 
http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/advocacy/state-advocacy-arc/state-
advocacy-campaigns/ftc-engagement.page (last visited Jan. 4, 2014).  
257. Nat’l Soc’y Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 689 (1978). 
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medical practice.’”258 That is, apparently anticompetitive restrictions 
require not just a rationale but substantiation.259 
The rationale commonly offered on behalf of disparate treatment 
of APRNs turns on what are supposed to be qualitative and quantita-
tive superiority in physician training and education. For example, in 
comments submitted to West Virginia legislators, the AMA recently 
argued as follows:  
By virtue of their education and training, physicians are best 
qualified to lead health care teams. Physicians and nurses com-
plete their education and training with different types of 
knowledge, skills, and abilities that are complementary, not 
equivalent. Physicians receive far more education, clinical train-
ing, and continuing medical education to ensure they are well 
equipped to diagnose and manage patient care. For example, a 
primary care physician gains 21,700 hours of clinical education 
and training, compared to an average of 5,350 hours of clinical 
education and training for APRNs. This difference in education 
and training matters.260 
Indeed, difference in education and training may matter in many 
ways, but why “this difference” for this policy choice? Suppose we 
take the AMA tallies at face value.261 What patient health or safety 
 
258. Va. Acad. of Clinical Psychologists v. Blue Shield of Va., 624 F.2d 476, 
485 (4th Cir. 1980). 
259. As noted above, this is a claim that potentially countervailing consumer 
protection concerns must, at a minimum, be well-founded. It does not 
follow that antitrust demands any particular type of evidence or level of 
substantiation or that antitrust concerns evaporate in the presence of 
any demonstrable consumer risk. 
260. Madara Letter, supra note 67, at 2. 
261. It is unclear how the AMA arrives at this tally. A recent report cites the 
same number of hours for both professional groups. GREG MARTIN, AM. 
ACAD. OF FAM. PHYSICIANS, EDUCATION AND TRAINING: FAMILY 
PHYSICIANS AND NURSE PRACTITIONERS, available at 
http://www.aafp.org/dam/AAFP/documents/news/NP-Kit-FP-NP-
UPDATED.pdf. Mr. Martin’s numbers are presented as estimates, and 
his 21,700 hours appears to sum not merely clinical training but all 
education, training, and study hours – including both classroom and 
estimated studying time for the pre-clinical years – from the beginning 
of medical school through residency. Id. at 2. In fact, required training 
hours appear to vary at least somewhat according to differences in state 
regulations, training programs, certification, etc. For a general overview 
of training and education requirements, compare NAT’L COUNCIL STATE 
BDS. OF NURSING, CONSENSUS MODEL FOR APRN REGULATION: 
LICENSURE, ACCREDITATION, CERTIFICATION & EDUCATION (2008), 
available at 
https://www.ncsbn.org/Consensus_Model_for_APRN_Regulation_Jul
y_2008.pdf, with ACCREDITATION COUNCIL FOR GRADUATE MED. EDUC. 
(ACGME), COMMON PROGRAM REQUIREMENTS (2011), available at 
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benefits accrue, and in what practice contexts, as one moves from 
5,350 hours (as attributed to APRN and prior training) to 21,700 (as 
attributed to MD training)?262 Do such benefits accrue demonstrably 
(even plausibly) across all health care services or are they associated 
primarily with particular indications, procedures, or practice environ-
ments?  
FTC staff comments typically have been submitted where evi-
dence of such benefits in the legislative or regulatory record were 
slight or wholly absent. Viewed from the competition policy perspec-
tive, this seems a regulatory failing independent of the question of 
what the evidence might suggest were it gathered and considered. 
Generalist or specialist physicians may enjoy diverse relative competi-
tive advantages and future research may help to delineate such 
advantages, perhaps to the mutual benefit of physicians and health 
care consumers. Evidence linking particular differences in education 
and training to deficits in APRN practice seems chronically lacking, 
however.263 Rather, “[e]ducational standards . . . support broader 
practice by all types of APRNs.”264 
None of this should disparage the clinical and basic science learn-
ing that medical schools have to offer or the long drive towards 
qualitative improvement in medical education seen since Abraham 
 
http://www.acgme.org/acgmeweb/Portals/0/PFAssets/ProgramResourc
es/Common_Program_Requirements_07012011[1].pdf. 
262. The raw number of hours may be less important than their constitution, 
and the best configuration of didactic and experiential hours has been a 
moving target. Some medical schools are pushing the debate by 
shortening their pre-clinical curricula. Baylor Medical School, for 
example, has a one-and-a-half year pre-clinical curriculum and shortened 
clinical curriculum. See Curriculum That Allows You to Customize Your 
Education, BAYLOR COLL. OF MED., 
http://www.bcm.edu/medschool/curriculum.html (last visited Jan. 4, 
2014). Even the IOM has questioned whether traditional programs 
overemphasize basic science content as a foundation for training that is 
responsive to health care needs of most citizens. Even the IOM has 
questioned whether traditional programs overemphasize basic science 
content as a foundation for training that is responsive to health care 
needs of most citizens. INST. OF MED., HEALTH PROFESSIONS EDUCATION: 
A BRIDGE TO QUALITY 81-82 (Ann C. Greiner & Elisa Knebel eds., 
2003). 
263. Eileen T. O’Grady, Advanced Practice Registered Nurses: The Impact 
on Patient Safety and Quality, in DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., 
PATIENT SAFETY & QUALITY: AN EVIDENCE-BASED HANDBOOK FOR 
NURSES, § 43, at 8 (Ronda G. Hughes ed., 2008) (“[H]igh degree of 
variation suggests that the regulatory framework for APN practice is 
not evidence-based and that States are not promulgating APN 
regulations with a coherent patient safety orientation.”). 
264. IOM FUTURE OF NURSING REPORT, supra note 1, at 98. 
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Flexner’s 1910 report to the Carnegie Foundation.265 The educational 
institutions that Flexner reviewed – and in many cases derided – 
badly needed reform. Medical schools, into the early decades of the 
twentieth century, frequently were proprietary and entrepreneurial – 
many of them had dubious entry (or graduation) requirements and 
lacked essential components, such as qualified teachers, clinical 
teaching facilities, and laboratories.266 As such, they could not have 
provided the classic economic justification for minimum entry re-
quirements, as assurances provided to uninformed consumers facing 
daunting information costs.267  
To ask about the empirical underpinnings of entry restrictions or 
any other health care regulations is not to advocate for competition 
from pre-Flexner internists (or pre-Lister surgeons, or pre-1953 
medical geneticists). If principles of institutional design suggest that 
innovations and operations be subject to measurement and evalua-
tion,268 neither such principles nor any from antitrust suggest that 
innovation cannot precede an empirical demonstration of need, much 
less that we should expect such demonstrations to be decisive. Setting 
a regulatory floor – and thereby prohibiting both the provision and 
the consumption of certain services – is a different matter, however. 
Perhaps it is worth noting that even Flexner came to question his 
early dismissal of access issues, “convinced that the distribution of 
physicians was a more serious problem than he had originally antici-
pated.”269 
 
265. ABRAHAM FLEXNER, MEDICAL EDUCATION IN THE UNITED STATES AND 
CANADA: REPORT TO THE CARNEGIE FOUNDATION FOR THE 
ADVANCEMENT OF TEACHING (1910), available at 
http://www.carnegiefoundation.org/sites/default/files/elibrary/Carnegie
_Flexner_Report.pdf. See also BEYOND FLEXNER: MEDICAL EDUCATION 
IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY (Barbara Barzansky & Norman Gevitz 
eds., 1992) (regarding the influence of the Flexner report). 
266. FLEXNER, supra note 265, at 84, 102. 
267. Flexner’s observations on Alabama were hardly the worst of these. 
Nonetheless, he described entrance requirements for Birmingham 
Medical College as “nominal,” and his summary of the state’s two 
offerings began as follows: “The foregoing account makes it clear that 
really satisfactory medical education is not now to be had in Alabama. 
The entrance standards are low; the schools are inadequately equipped; 
and they are without proper financial resources. To get together their 
present numbers, standards must be kept low; in consequence, the 
medical schools do nothing to promote or share the secondary school 
development of the state.” Id. at 185-86. 
268. See KOVACIC, supra note 39, at 16-19, 144-77 (applying such principles 
to the FTC itself). 
269. PAUL STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE 
124-27 (1982) (discussing post-Flexner disparities). 
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More broadly, while competition principles may identify competi-
tive costs – sometimes to the detriment of policy proposals and 
sometimes to the detriment of certain commercial conduct or pro-
posed transactions – they do not stipulate, or provide mechanisms for 
determining, optimal regulations. Antitrust fundamentally is not a 
regulatory model,270 just as it is not a means of industrial planning or 
market design. Antitrust defers generally to the process of competi-
tion, which it seeks to protect by intervening to prevent (ex ante) or 
remedy (ex post) certain practices or proposals that would impede 
competition (sufficiently and in certain ways deemed remediable).271 
Our general discussion of licensure early in this paper listed vari-
ous potential costs and benefits to professional regulation but left 
much unsettled. One nagging question has to do with a sort of 
regulatory burden of proof that one or another dominant theory of 
licensure may imply.272 Supposing one wants licensure restrictions to 
rest on some substantial empirical ground, one might adopt a general-
ly permissive regime, permitting wide latitude in practice except 
where there is evidence of substantial harm or risk. In the alternative, 
one might begin with a cramped notion of professional privilege and 
require justification for each categorical expansion of that privilege.  
Construed broadly, the nursing advocacies identify competition 
concerns raised by a radically divided approach to the regulation of 
health care professionals. That approach would adopt a highly 
permissive regime when regulating physicians and would be very 
careful about – and hesitant to impose – any categorical restrictions 
on the “practice of medicine.” But when regulating nurses, the 
approach would begin with a very well-cabined notion of the “practice 
of nursing” and would be very cautious about any expansion of that 
practice, especially any expansion that may impinge upon the profes-
sional prerogatives of physicians. Certainly, a conservative approach 
to regulation is not per se offensive to competition principles.273 We 
 
270. See, e.g., BORK, supra note 118, at 69-70 (“The antitrust laws are 
wholly prohibitory and passive in nature, so that they are effective only 
to screen conduct that private parties themselves originate. Unlike many 
other laws, therefore, antitrust is wholly unable to serve values that 
must be implemented by requiring or inducing affirmative conduct 
which the self-interest or capabilities of private persons do not cause or 
permit them to undertake.”). 
271. See id. 
272. If neither theory determines a model of regulation, much less particular 
rules, we note that the capture theory may be generally suspicious of 
substantial barriers to entry implemented in licensing or scope of 
practice rules, while the market failure theory may be generally 
conciliatory of such restrictions. 
273. Former FTC Chairman Louis Engman put it the other way: “Though 
most government regulation was enacted under the guise of protecting 
the consumer from abuse, much of today’s regulatory machinery does 
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may be concerned, however, when a minimalist approach applies to 
one group of competitors and a maximalist approach to another. We 
may be especially concerned when members of one profession work 
consistently, and concertedly, to secure such a divided approach.  
The roots of this bifurcated regulatory approach run long if not 
deep. Early medical practice acts required licensure and perhaps 
training at an accredited institution but did little to define or con-
strain the scope of medical practice.274 An early case notes simply, 
“There is nothing . . . evidencing a legislative intent that the term 
‘practicing medicine’ should bear other than its common meaning. It 
will be observed that the Act . . . embraces ‘the practice of the 
healing art,’ instead of merely ‘the practice of medicine and sur-
gery.’”275 Later medical practice acts, while more detailed, were not 
especially confining of medical practice.276  
Early nursing acts were much more constrained. Like medical 
practice acts, they required registration or certification and restricted 
at least the title “registered nurse” to those meeting certain educa-
tional or training requirements.277 Scope of practice, however, was 
defined narrowly, or as dependent on the direction of a licensed 
physician.278 APRNs and CRNAs simply did not exist, as APRN types 
of training and certification programs, and corresponding regulatory 
classifications, did not emerge until the 1960s.279  
The IOM summarizes the present situation as follows: 
Because virtually all states still base their licensure frameworks 
on the persistent underlying principle that the practice of medi-
cine encompasses both the ability and the legal authority to 
 
little more than shelter producers from the normal competitive 
consequences of lassitude and inefficiency.” Lewis A. Engman, 
Chairman, FTC, Address before 1974 Fall Conference of the Financial 
Analysts Federation (Oct. 7, 1974). 
274. See STARR, supra note 269, at 104. Antecedents to these medical 
practice acts date back further still, including an eighteenth century 
Maryland law creating a Board of Medical Examiners and a 1639 
Virginia law restricting prices charged for medical services. See Hogan, 
supra note 104, at 118. 
275. Rubin v. United States, 37 F.2d 991, 992 (D.C. Cir. 1930). 
276. Barbara J. Safriet, Closing the Gap between Can and May in Health-
Care Providers’ Scopes of Practice: A Primer for Policymakers, 19 
YALE J. ON REG. 301, 306-07 (2002) (“Once medicine’s scope of practice 
was thus comprehensively defined in law, almost any activity directed at 
‘health or sickness’ . . . was deemed to be the practice of medicine.”).  
277. Safriet, supra note 97, at 454 (citation omitted). 
278. Id. 
279. Id. at 423-24; JULIE FAIRMAN, MAKING ROOM IN THE CLINIC: NURSE 
PRACTITIONERS AND THE EVOLUTION OF MODERN HEALTH CARE (2008). 
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treat all possible human conditions, the scopes of practice for 
APRNs (and other health professionals) are exercises in legisla-
tive exception making, a “carving out” of small, politically 
achievable spheres of practice authority from the universal do-
main of medicine.280 
The IOM argues that the results of this approach have been widely 
off the mark. Although some states have reformed scope of practice 
rules to keep pace with changes in medicine and nursing, in most 
states, “[W]hat nurse practitioners are able to do once they graduate 
varies widely for reasons that are related not to their ability, educa-
tion or training, or safety concerns, but to the political decisions of 
the state in which they work.”281  
Regulatory development often exhibits a certain path-dependency, 
and existing rules may reflect the historical context of their origins as 
much as contemporary assessments of patient care. Neither history 
nor habit is much of a rationale, however, much less an adequately 
substantiated rationale.282  
Conclusion 
The Institute of Medicine’s Future of Nursing report identifies an 
important health policy role for the federal antitrust agencies, notably 
the FTC. But while the report identifies some of the potential benefits 
of health care competition,283 it is not concerned with competition per 
se. Rather, it assesses the current state of nursing education, training, 
and practice, and it considers potential qualitative improvements to 
all of them, including improvements to the larger social or economic 
environment within which nurses practice. Improving the ability of 
nurses to work to both present and future potentials is important 
because of extant unmet needs for basic health care services. Such 
needs are understood in health policy terms – both medical and 
political – that may be distinguished from a competition-based notion 
of artificially suppressed supply, even if reference cases may be 
coincident. 
The nexus between the IOM project and the FTC’s is a baseline 
concern with consumer welfare. Antitrust law is concerned with the 
competitive effects of mergers or certain types of conduct that 
 
280. IOM FUTURE OF NURSING REPORT, supra note 1, at 97. 
281. Id. at 5. 
282. Neither, of course, is professional or other social bias. Id. at 107-11; 
Barbara J. Safriet, Federal Options for Maximizing the Value of 
Advanced Practice Nurses in Providing Quality, Cost-Effective Health 
Care, in IOM FUTURE OF NURSING REPORT, supra note 1, at 452-54, 456-
60. 
283. See, e.g., IOM FUTURE OF NURSING REPORT, supra note 1, at 5. 
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impinge upon consumer welfare,284 where conduct sometimes compris-
es regulation. Competition policy is concerned with competitive effects 
on consumers more broadly, as it escapes some of the particular 
statutory and doctrinal limits associated with the Sherman and 
Clayton Acts. Access problems are a special concern for competition – 
as well as other areas of health policy – because of the baseline 
concern with consumer welfare and because of the outsize impact of 
access to basic or essential services on consumer welfare. Concomitant 
with basic notions of the decreasing marginal utility of money and 
other valued commodities, one takes (or gives) the most when one 
takes (or gives) a consumer’s nth unit as n approaches 1.285  
With Commission approval, FTC staff have issued a series of ad-
vocacy comments addressing regulatory strictures imposed on nurses’ 
scope of practice. Acknowledging measurement difficulties, it appears 
that state regulators typically have identified FTC staff recommenda-
tions as useful to their deliberations and have followed those 
recommendations roughly half of the time. 
The advocacy comments represent a species of soft administrative 
intervention providing critical competition analyses to state policy 
makers – a sort of nudge – that may be distinguished from more 
typical Agency guidance in at least two fundamental regards. First, 
competition advocacies tend to address government officials, rather 
than industry stakeholders or consumers. Second, the advocacies 
apply an Agency understanding of the competition principles underly-
ing the antitrust laws, but are not confined to interpreting those laws 
or recommending compliance with them. In particular, they have 
asked that state policy makers account for competitive costs when 
considering scope of practice restrictions, and they have recommended 
that substantial competitive costs – especially those associated with 
diminished access to basic health care services – not be imposed on 
the public absent an evidence-based promise of countervailing 
consumer protection benefits.  
They have done so in cases where the evidentiary basis for regula-
tory costs imposed on health care consumers appears to be 
inadequate. Consider the following from the Louisiana State Board of 
Medical Examiners: 
 
284. See generally Salop, supra note 53; Baker, supra note 53; HORIZONTAL 
MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 53. 
285. For analogous reasons, last dollar fraud is a special concern for the 
FTC’s consumer protection mission. See, e.g., Edith Ramirez, Comm’r, 
FTC, Address at Women in Housing & Finance, Last Dollar Fraud: The 
FTC’s Response to the Foreclosure Crisis (Jan. 27, 2011), 
http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/ramirez/110127whf.pdf. 
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The Board’s opinion is not and cannot be altered by representa-
tions that a particular CRNA [Certified Registered Nurse 
Anesthetist] has received postdoctoral training in such areas or 
has performed such activities in this or another state. A non-
physician may have education, training, and, indeed, expertise 
in such an area but expertise cannot, in and of itself, supply au-
thority under law to practice medicine.286 
As a legal matter, the analysis may be trivially correct: education, 
training, experience, and expertise do not, in themselves, bestow legal 
authority or lift statutory prohibitions. As a policy matter, however, 
we might wonder about the bases on which we both assign and limit 
the authority to meet demand – unmet needs – for health care. 
However we allocate research resources, tolerate uncertainty, and 
calibrate substantiation standards, we might say this much when 
substantiation appears to approach zero: based on competition 
principles at least, nothing ought to beget nothing, except, perhaps, 
scrutiny. 
 
 
286. Safriet, supra note 97, at 454.  
